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INTRODUCTION 
 
An array of emerging scientific and technological innovations 
promises  to  reshape  contemporary  society. The  healthcare,  financial,   and 
agricultural  sectors,  among  others, stand to be transformed by  innovations  
in  areas such  as  nanotechnology,1  information  technology,2 and  biotech- 
																																								 																				
1 See Vincent Mangematin & Steve Walsh, The Future of Nanotechnologies, 32 
TECHNOVATION 157, 157 (2012) (“[N]anotechnologies promise greater and more equal 
access to knowledge and information; new therapeutic interventions; improved 
environmental monitoring; greater safety and security; expanded communication capacities 
and many other industrial and societal applications.”); Hailmichael Teshome Demissie, 
Taming Matter for the Welfare of Humanity: Regulating Nanotechnology, in REGULATING 
TECHNOLOGIES: LEGAL FUTURES, REGULATORY FRAMES AND TECHNOLOGICAL FIXES 327–
40 (Roger Brownsword & Karen Yeung eds., 2008) (describing the “transformative 
potential” of nanotechnology).  
2 See Sagarmay Deb, Information Technology, Its Impact on Society and Its Future, 4 
ADVANCES IN COMPUTING 25, 25–29 (2014) (discussing the past and potential future impacts 
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nology.3 In addition to their transformative potential, these innovations are 
notable for the unprecedented rate at which they have emerged and continue 
to evolve.4 As a growing body of literature observes, such technologies pose 
unique challenges to U.S. legal institutions, outrunning the normal pace of 
legal change and placing pressure on regulators to creatively deal with their 
rise.5 This tension between innovation and the law is forcing regulators, 
																																								 																				
of information technologies on business, medicine, education, and government); see also 
Monroe E. Price, The Newness of New Technologies, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1885, 1886 (2001)  
(speculating that innovations in “satellite [technologies], the Internet, and other information 
technologies will lead to the greatest revolution in information since the invention of the 
printing press”). 
3 See Ronald Evens & Kenneth Kaitin, The Evolution of Biotechnology and its Impact on 
Health Care, 34 HEALTH AFFAIRS 210, 218 (2015) (observing that biotechnology has and 
will continue to produce a “continuing stream of novel medicines” which will have an 
“extraordinary impact” on health care); STEWART BRAND, THE CLOCK OF THE LONG NOW: 
TIME AND RESPONSIBILITY 13–14 (2000) (arguing that biological knowledge grows at an 
“exponential” rate and is transforming the “agriculture, nutrition, and healthcare” industries). 
4 See Braden Allenby, The Dynamics of Emerging Technology Systems, in INNOVATIVE 
GOVERNANCE MODELS FOR EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 19–43 (Gary E. Marchant et al. ed., 2013) 
(arguing that the evolutionary pace and complexity of new emerging technologies, including 
nanotechnologies, biotechnologies, and information technologies, are unprecedented); RAY 
KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR (2005) (documenting the accelerating rate of 
technological change); DEREK J. DE SOLLA PRICE, LITTLE SCIENCE, BIG SCIENCE…AND BEYOND 
(1986) (arguing that the number of “important discoveries” has doubled every 20 years); Gordon 
E. Moore, Progress in Digital Integrated Electronics, TECH. DIGEST, 1975, at 11–13 (arguing 
that computing power doubles every 18-24 months); see also Rita Gunther McGrath, The Pace 
of Technology Adoption is Speeding Up, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 25, 2013), https://hbr. 
org/2013/11/the-pace-of-technology-adoption-is-speeding-up [https://perma.cc/7DZW-WU5L] 
(summarizing several empirical analyses of the increasing rates of introduction and adoption of 
new technologies); Ilkka Tuomi, Kurzweil, Moore, and Accelerating Change 1–9 (Inst. for 
Prospective Tech. Studies, Working Paper, 2003), http://meaningprocessing.com/personalPages/ 
tuomi/articles/Kurzweil.pdf (same).  
5 See INNOVATIVE GOVERNANCE MODELS FOR EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES (Gary E. Marchant et 
al. eds., 2013) (collecting essays on the incongruous rate at which the law and some emerging 
technologies evolve); THE GROWING GAP BETWEEN EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND LEGAL-
ETHICAL OVERSIGHT (Gary E. Marchant et al. eds., 2011) (same); REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES: 
LEGAL FUTURES, REGULATORY FRAMES AND TECHNOLOGICAL FIXES (Roger Brownsword & 
Karen Yeung eds., 2008) (same); see also U.S. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-CIT-302, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 3 (1986) 
(“Once a relatively slow and ponderous process, technological change is now outpacing the legal 
structure that governs the system . . . .”); Richard S. Whitt, Adaptive Policymaking: Evolving and 
Applying Emergent Solutions for U.S. Commun-ications Policy, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 483, 497–
98 (2009) (“[M]arket sectors featuring rapid and dynamic technological change . . . challenge the 
policymaker’s ability to predict, control, and manage the system’s behavior.”); David Rejeski, 
The Next Small Thing, 21 ENVTL. F. 42, 45 (2004) (“We have moved into . . . a . . . world 
dominated by rapid improvements in products, processes, and organizations, all moving at rates 
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policymakers, and scholars to consider whether and how the law should 
respond to rapidly emerging technologies—a challenge centered on the need 
to simultaneously balance both public safety and the promotion of tantalizing 
social, economic, and environmental benefits.6 
One of the most promising innovations in this cohort of rapidly 
emerging and potentially transformative technologies is autonomous vehicles.7 
It is widely agreed that autonomous vehicles have the potential to revolutionize 
personal and commercial transportation.8 In particular, autonomous vehicles 
																																								 																				
that exceed the ability of our traditional governing institutions to adapt or shape outcomes. If you 
think that any existing regulatory framework can keep pace with this rate of change, think 
again.”); John H. Pearson, Regulating in the Face of Technological Advance: Who Makes These 
Calls Anyway?, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1, 1–2 (1999) (suggesting that 
technological advances are now “so fast and furious that they raise severe doubts about how and 
if the legal and governmental structures of western democracy . . . can respond”). 
6 See Gregory N. Mandel, Regulating Emerging Technologies, 1 L. INNOVATION & TECH. 75, 75 
(2009) (“The challenge is how to simultaneously leverage a promising innovation’s anticipated 
benefits while guarding against its potential risks . . . .”); Christopher Bosso, The Enduring 
Embrace: The Regulatory Ancien Régime and Governance of Nanomaterials in the U.S., 9 
NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 381, 381 (2013) (framing the regulation of technological 
innovations as the challenge of balancing potential benefits against potential risks and negative 
impacts); Albert C. Lin, Size Matters: Regulating Nanotechnology, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
350, 375 (2007) (describing in similar terms “the challenge” of regulating nanotechnology as that 
of “address[ing] health and environmental concerns without crippling [a] promising industry”). 
7 As used in this article, the term “autonomous vehicle” refers to fully autonomous vehicles, 
or autonomous vehicles which require no active human control. See generally SOCIETY OF 
AUTOMOTIVE ENGINEERS, TAXONOMY AND DEFINITIONS FOR TERMS RELATED TO ON-ROAD 
MOTOR VEHICLE AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEMS (2016) (outlining a taxonomy for motor 
vehicle automation). Although intermediate levels of automation are already available in the 
marketplace, see Kersten Heineke et al., Self-Driving Car Technology: When Will the Robots 
Hit the Road?, MCKINSEY & CO. (May 17, 2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/ 
automotive-and-assembly/our-insights/self-driving-car-technology-when-will-the-robots-hit-
the-road [https://perma.cc/5UX2-JWXE], full automation poses the greatest challenge to 
existing regulatory structures because it eliminates an historical constant: human drivers; see 
generally Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Vehicles are Probably Legal in the United 
States, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 411, 412 (2014) (discussing comprehensively the challenge of 
regulating autonomous vehicles under existing domestic and international law). 
8 See, e.g., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES 
POLICY 5 (2016) [hereinafter NHTSA POLICY 2016] (“The development of advanced 
automated vehicle . . . technologies . . . may prove to be the greatest personal transportation 
revolution since the popularization of the personal automobile nearly a century ago.”); JAMES 
A. ANDERSON ET AL., RAND CORP., AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGIES: A GUIDE FOR 
POLICYMAKERS xiii (2016) [hereinafter RAND REPORT] (“Autonomous vehicle (AV) 
technology offers the possibility of fundamentally changing transportation.”); ENO CTR. FOR 
TRANSP., PREPARING A NATION FOR AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES: OPPORTUNITIES, BARRIERS 
AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2013) [hereinafter ENO REPORT] (“AVs have the 
potential to fundamentally alter transportation systems . . . .”). 
Vol. 4:1]       Autonomous Vehicles: Problems and Principles for Future Regulation 
 
 
85 
promise to deliver significant social, economic, and environmental benefits to 
both consumers and businesses. These benefits include a drastic reduction in 
the number traffic fatalities and injuries, significant gains in individual 
productivity, unprecedented mobility for the elderly and disabled populations, 
greater flexibility in urban planning, and a reduction in harmful vehicle 
emissions.9 As automobile manufacturers and technology firms race closer to 
the technological viability of fully autonomous vehicles, the hypothesized 
benefits of these vehicles are closer than ever to becoming a reality.10  
Nevertheless, the widespread adoption of autonomous vehicles is far 
from guaranteed. One significant potential obstacle is the legal environment 
within which they must continue to develop and operate. Although regulation 
can help to facilitate the commercial success of emerging technologies,11 as well 
as manage their potential risks,12 it also has potential drawbacks.13 In the context 
of autonomous vehicles, attempts to overcome the incongruous rates at which 
the law and automation technologies evolve may lead to suboptimal outcomes.14 
Indeed, the most common responses to this “pacing problem”15 generate their 
own impediments to the widespread commercial adopt of autonomous vehicle 
technologies.16 The challenge of regulating autonomous vehicles, as such, is to 
identify a regulatory approach which addresses the tension between innovation 
and regulation in a way which maximizes potential benefits and minimizes  
																																								 																				
9 See infra Part I.A (discussing the potential benefits of autonomous vehicles). 
10 See RAND REPORT, supra note 8, at 74 (“Efforts of the last 15 years, first by universities 
and then by industry, have brought this technology to near readiness.”). 
11 See, e.g., Larry Downes, The Right and Wrong Way to Regulate Self-Driving Cars, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (Dec. 6, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/12/the-right-and-wrong-ways-to-regulate-self-driving-
cars [https://perma.cc/3JK8-4TX5] (“Done correctly, an evolving legal system can encourage 
optimal investment in technologies that will increase social welfare, public safety, and sustainable 
energy consumption, as well as positively impact labor markets, land use, public health, and 
more.”). 
12 See, e.g., WORLD COMM’N ON THE ETHICS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND TECH., THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, 7–53 (2005), http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001395/1 
39578e.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JK8-4TX5] (defending the role of regulation in minimizing 
risks to public health and safety in the face of scientific and technological uncertainty).  
13 See, e.g., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF 
POLICY CONCERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES 10 (2013) [hereinafter NHTSA POLICY 2013] 
(“[T]he agency recognizes that premature regulation can run the risk of putting the brakes on 
the evolution toward increasingly better vehicle safety technologies.”). 
14 See infra Part II.B (analyzing the impacts of different regulatory approaches on the 
commercial success of their target technologies, including autonomous vehicles). 
15 Gary E. Marchant, The Growing Gap Between Emerging Technologies and the Law, in 
THE GROWING GAP BETWEEN EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND LEGAL-ETHICAL OVERSIGHT 
23 (Gary E. Marchant et al. eds., 2011) (coining the phrase “pacing problem”). 
16 See infra Part II.B (arguing further that traditional approaches to managing the pacing 
problem may directly or indirectly deprive society of the benefits of autonomous vehicles). 
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potential risks. In this article, I directly address that challenge and offer a novel 
approach to the regulation of autonomous vehicles informed by the principles of 
planned adaptive regulation. 
In Part I, I briefly summarize the most significant anticipated benefits 
of autonomous vehicles and outline the regulatory environment within which 
autonomous vehicles currently operate. In Part II, I closely examine the 
unique regulatory challenge posed by rapidly evolving technologies like 
autonomous vehicles and identify three common responses to that challenge. 
In doing so, I draw on Part I to illustrate each response in the context of 
autonomous vehicle regulation and describe the way in which each could 
hamper the adoption of autonomous vehicle technologies. Finally, in Part III, 
I offer an approach to the regulation of autonomous vehicles which aims to 
address the shortcomings of existing regulatory approaches and adds to the 
nascent literature on adaptive regulation. I argue that any system for 
regulating autonomous vehicles must directly address the limited reactive and 
adaptive capabilities of U.S. legal institutions, rather than circumvent these 
limitations by attempting to perfect regulatory frameworks ex ante. To 
operationalize this evolutionary paradigm, I propose a new approach 
informed by the principles of planned adaptive regulation. 
 
I. THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND CURRENT REGULATION  
OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 
 
The potential benefits of autonomous vehicles are substantial.17 As 
former Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx remarked in 2016, “[t]he 
development of advanced automated vehicle . . . technologies . . . may prove 
to be the greatest personal transportation revolution since the popularization 
of the personal automobile nearly a century ago.”18 Although the technology 
for full automation continues to develop,19 widespread commercial adoption 
of autonomous vehicle technology promises to deliver a wide range of social, 
economic, and environmental benefits.20 The precise magnitude of these 
benefits is difficult to predict, but existing research suggests that the net 
																																								 																				
17 See generally Tracy Hresko Pearl, Fast & Furious: The Misregulation of Driverless Cars, 
73 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 19, 35–43 (2017) (providing a detailed discussion of the likely 
benefits of autonomous vehicles). 
18 NHTSA POLICY 2016, supra note 8, at 5. 
19 See TODD LITMAN, VICTORIA TRANSP. POLICY INST., AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE 
IMPLEMENTATION PREDICTIONS 10–13 (2018) (describing the limits of existing autonomous 
vehicle technology and deployment). 
20 See generally RAND REPORT, supra note 8, at 9–36 (providing an overview of the likely 
benefits of autonomous vehicles); Pearl, supra note 17, at 35–43 (same). 
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impact of autonomous vehicles will be significant.21 In this Part, I briefly 
summarize the most significant of these predicted benefits and describe the 
regulatory environment within which autonomous vehicle technology must 
continue to develop and operate. 
 
A.  The Potential Benefits of Autonomous Vehicles 
 
1. Transportation Safety 
 
The most notable predicted benefit of autonomous vehicle technology 
is a substantial reduction in the human and economic toll of traffic 
accidents.22 In 2016, there were more than 7.2 million reported vehicle 
accidents resulting in 3.14 million injured people and over 37,000 deaths.23 
According to the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration 
(NHTSA), 94 percent of all vehicle crashes are attributable to human error.24 
These sources of error include, but are not limited to, “driving too fast, 
																																								 																				
21 See, e.g., Morgan Stanley, Autonomous Cars: Self-Driving the New Auto Industry 
Paradigm, Blue Paper (2013) (discussing economic benefits); Daniel J. Fagant & Kara M. 
Kockelman, The Travel and Environmental Implications of Shared Autonomous Vehicles, 
Using Agent-Based Model Scenarios, 40 TRANSP. RESEARCH PART C 1, 8–10 (2013) 
(discussing environmental benefits); Pearl, supra note 17, at 35–39 (discussing public health 
benefits). The realization of these benefits will not necessarily have a perfectly linear 
correlation with the market saturation of autonomous vehicles. Instead, the majority of 
benefits may not be realized until autonomous vehicles constitute a certain minimum 
percentage of the overall vehicle population. Similarly, autonomous vehicles may impose 
new costs, such as displacing existing institutions, services, and jobs. On balance, however, 
the benefits of autonomous vehicles are likely to far outweigh their costs. See MORGAN 
STANLEY, supra note 21, at 7 (estimating total net economic benefits of more than $1.3 trillion 
annually in the U.S. and $5.6 trillion annually across the globe once autonomous vehicles reach 
peak market penetration). 
22 In its 2016 policy statement, NHTSA hailed autonomous vehicle technology as a “potentially 
unprecedented advance in safety on U.S. roads and highways.” NHTSA POLICY 2016, supra 
note 8, at 5. 
23 NAT’L CTR. FOR STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., 
2016 MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES: OVERVIEW 1 (2017), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/ 
Public/Publication/812456 [https://perma.cc/FA5C-PN9H]; Traffic Safety Facts Annual 
Report Tables: National Statistics, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., https://cdan. 
nhtsa.gov/tsftables/National%20Statistics.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ENQ-9XQZ]. 
24 Automated Vehicles for Safety, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., https://www. 
nhtsa.gov/technology-innovation/automated-vehicles [https://perma.cc/2WVR-DJPX] (last 
visited Aug. 18, 2018). In addition, “[e]ven when the critical reason behind a crash is 
attributed to the vehicle, roadway or environment, additional human factors . . . are regularly 
found to have contributed to the crash occurrence and/or injury severity.” ENO REPORT, 
supra note 8, at 3. 
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misjudging other drivers’ behaviors, alcohol impairment, distraction, and 
fatigue.”25 Indeed, impairment, distractions, and fatigue alone account for 
over 50 percent of all fatal crashes.26 The use of autonomous vehicles could 
significantly reduce the incidence of such crashes, as vehicles with no human 
operators are never drunk, distracted, fatigued, or otherwise susceptible to 
human failings.27 In addition, any reduction in accidents would offer 
significant economic benefits in the form of fewer hospital stays, days of 
work missed, lives lost, and instances of property damage, among other 
savings.28 In 2015 alone, vehicle crashes cost the U.S. economy $300 billion, 
or 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), meaning that even a 25 
percent reduction in accidents could save nearly $100 billion annually.29 
																																								 																				
25 Shaping the Future of Autonomous Vehicles: How Policymakers Can Promote Safety, 
Mobility, and Efficiency in an Uncertain World: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Transp., 
Housing and Urban Dev., and Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 114th 
Cong. 2 (2016) (statement of Nidhi Kalra, Senior Info. Scientist, RAND Corp.) [hereinafter 
Kalra Testimony] (citations omitted). 
26 Id. (adding together all crash data due to drunk, distracted, or fatigued drivers). 
27 See Neal Katyal, Disruptive Technologies and the Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 1685, 1688 (2014) 
(estimating that 90 percent market penetration would prevent over 4 million crashes annually). 
Indeed, “most autonomous vehicle researchers agree that fully autonomous vehicles can 
drastically improve highway safety.” Pearl, supra note 17, at 38 n.122 (providing a compre-
hensive review of research to this effect); see also Press Release, Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety 
Admin., U.S. DOT, National Safety Council Launch ‘Road to Zero’ Coalition to End Roadway 
Fatalities (Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/us-dot-national-safety-
council-launch-road-zero-coalition-end-roadway-fatalities [https://perma.cc/HD3U-B2XN] 
(“With the rapid introduction of automated vehicles . . . the Department believes it is now 
increasingly likely that the vision of zero road deaths and serious injuries can be achieved in the 
next 30 years.”). Autonomous vehicles could also improve the avoidance of others, such as 
pedestrians, who are still prone to human error. Cf. RAND REPORT, supra note 8, at 16 n.3 (noting 
further that “49 percent of pedestrians killed by motor vehicles are under the influence of alcohol” 
and that “38 percent of cyclists killed by motor vehicles are under the influence of alcohol”). Still, 
autonomous vehicles might not eliminate all accidents. For instance, “inclement weather and 
complex driving environments pose challenges for autonomous vehicles, as well as for human 
drivers, and autonomous vehicles might perform worse than human drivers in some cases. There 
is also the potential for autonomous vehicles to pose new and serious crash risks—for example, 
crashes resulting from cyberattacks.” Kalra Testimony, supra note 25, at 2–3 (citations omitted). 
28 See ENO REPORT, supra note 8, at 8; see also NHTSA POLICY 2013, supra note 13, at 1 
(“Preventing significant numbers of crashes will, in addition to relieving the enormous 
emotional toll on families, also greatly reduce the enormous related societal costs . . . that 
total in the hundreds of billions of dollars each year.”). 
29 ENO REPORT, supra note 8, at 3–4; see also Adam Ozimek, The Massive Economic Benefits 
of Self-Driving Cars, FORBES (Nov. 8, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/modeledbehave 
ior/2014/11/08/the-massive-economic-benefits-of-self-driving-cars/#127de25b68d9 [https:// 
perma.cc/2C3M-TK5L] (estimating in the alternative that all crashes combined cost the U.S. 
economy a total of $543 billion annually).  
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2. Access to Transportation 
 
Another important potential benefit of autonomous vehicle 
technology is increased mobility for populations currently unable or not 
permitted to operate traditional vehicles. These populations include older 
citizens, the disabled, people too young to drive, and others without a driver’s 
license.30 As Clyde Terry, Chair of the National Council on Disability, 
recently testified before Congress, “a lack of reliable and accessible 
transportation remains one of the biggest deterrents to employment and 
community involvement” for members of these populations.31 In turn, the 
widespread use of autonomous vehicles could dramatically increase the 
mobility of a wide range of people unable to operate traditional vehicles and 
have a transformative effect on their productivity, social wellbeing, and 
physical and mental health.32 Similarly, any increased freedom and indepen-
dence experienced by such populations could translate into gains in the 
productivity and wellbeing of caretakers, guardians, and family members.  
 
3. Traffic Congestion and Land Use 
 
In addition to making transportation safer and more accessible, 
autonomous vehicles could reduce congestion and change the way in which 
cities are planned. There are two ways in which autonomous vehicles could 
reduce congestion. First, although autonomous vehicles may lead to an 
increase in overall vehicle miles traveled,33 they have the potential to 
“support higher vehicle throughput rates on existing roads.”34 In particular, 
																																								 																				
30 RAND REPORT, supra note 8, at 16–17. 
31 Hands Off: The Future of Self-Driving Cars: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Science, 
Tech., & Transp., 114th Cong. 1, 4 (2016) (statement of Clyde Terry, Chair, Nat’l Council 
on Disability). 
32 Kalra Testimony, supra note 25, at 6–8; see also NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, SELF-
DRIVING CARS: MAPPING ACCESS TO A TECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION 11 (2015), http:// 
www.ncd.gov/sites/default/files/NCD_AutomatedVehiclesReport_508-PDF.pdf (“AVs will 
change the world for everyone, but the most dramatic impact could be for people with 
disabilities and people who are aging . . . . AVs can become an essential component of their 
independence, economic development, and well-being.”); cf. RAND REPORT, supra note 8, 
at xv (“Some of these [benefits] are currently provided by mass transit or paratransit 
agencies, but each of these alternatives has significant disadvantages. Mass transit generally 
requires fixed routes that may not serve people where they live and work [and] [p]aratransit 
services are expensive because they require a trained, salaried, human driver.”). 
33 See RAND REPORT, supra note 8, at 17–21. 
34 Id. at 21. Throughput rate is a measurement of the total number of vehicles moving 
between point A and point B within a given period of time. Id. 
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autonomous vehicles’ ability to “constantly monitor surrounding traffic and 
respond with finely tuned braking and acceleration adjustments should enable 
[them] to travel safely at higher speeds and with reduced headway (space) 
between each vehicle.”35 Second, autonomous vehicles have the potential to 
drastically reduce congestion stemming from traffic accidents.36 According 
to one estimate, accident-related congestion accounts for 25 percent of all 
congestion delays.37 In turn, because autonomous vehicles have the potential 
to prevent the vast majority of accidents, they could “eliminat[e] an 
appreciable share of all traffic delays.”38 These reductions would also carry 
weighty economic implications, as congestion is estimated to cost the U.S. 
over $160 billion annually.39 
A reduction in congestion and other changes in vehicle behavior could 
also positively impact existing patterns of land use. This impact would fall 
into two categories. First, autonomous vehicles could significantly reduce the 
amount of space devoted to vehicle parking within crowded urban areas.40 
The proximity of a vehicle owner to the parking place of an autonomous 
vehicle is far less relevant since autonomous vehicles could park themselves 
in remote locations and appear at a desired location upon request.41 As 
population density in urban areas continues to skyrocket,42 parking lots and 
																																								 																				
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 23. 
38 Id. 
39 David Schrank et al., 2015 Urban Mobility Scorecard, TEX. A&M TRANSP. INST. 1 (2015). 
This figure includes additional expenses (e.g., fuel) and opportunity costs (e.g., lost productivity). 
Id. Another estimate places the cost at closer to $100 billion annually. See Adeel Lari et. al., Self-
Driving Vehicles and Policy Implications: Current Status of Autonomous Vehicle Development 
and Minnesota Policy Implications, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 735, 752 (2015) (“Increases in 
capacity ultimately mean more convenient travel and reductions in congestion, which currently 
costs Americans $100 billion in wasted fuel and lost time, according to some reports.”). 
40 See David Levinson, Climbing Mount Next: The Effects of Autonomous Vehicles on 
Society, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 787, 805 (2015) (describing how autonomous vehicles 
would allow parking spaces to be “repurposed”). 
41  See id. (“Autonomous vehicles can drop off their passenger at the front door, and then park 
themselves in far less space than drivers currently require (or move on to their next passenger), 
and that space need not be so close to the most valuable urban areas.”). 
42 The United Nations (UN) estimates that, in 2010, a staggering 82 percent of the U.S. population 
already lived in urban areas. DEP’T OF ECON. AND SOC. AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS, WORLD 
URBANIZATION PROSPECTS 133 (2011), http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pub 
lications/pdf/urbanization/WUP2011_Report.pdf. It is further projected that “84.4 percent of 
Americans will live in urban areas [by 2020], with more than 28 percent living in urban areas of 
more than five million people.” CTR. FOR AUTOMOTIVE RES., SELF-DRIVING CARS: THE NEXT 
REVOLUTION 8 (2012) (citation omitted).  
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garages are projected to occupy increasingly valuable urban space, leading to 
“urban dead zones.”43 In some U.S. cities, “parking lots cover more than a 
third of the land area, becoming the single most salient feature of our built 
environment.”44 Autonomous vehicles offer an opportunity to repurpose such 
space for more socially and economically productive uses.45 Second, because 
autonomous vehicles allow their owners to engage in other activities while 
riding, individuals and firms may be more willing to “locate further away 
from the urban core.”46 This would help to alleviate urban crowding and 
make more affordable peripheral housing accessible and practical for those 
who cannot afford urban housing.47 
 
4. Energy and Emissions 
	
Finally, autonomous vehicle technology has the potential to reduce 
both energy consumption and pollution. Several factors could improve fuel 
economy in autonomous vehicles relative to traditional vehicles. These 
factors include efficiencies gained through smoother acceleration and 
deceleration, reduced distance between vehicles, and increased roadway 
capacity.48 In addition, given their potential to virtually eliminate traffic 
accidents, autonomous vehicles could be lighter than conventional vehicles, 
shedding the materials necessary to meet rigorous crash-test standards.49 Less 
obviously, autonomous vehicles may also help to reduce emissions by 
																																								 																				
43 CTR. FOR AUTOMOTIVE RES., supra note 42, at 8. 
44 ERAN BEN-JOSEPH, RETHINKING A LOT: THE DESIGN AND CULTURE OF PARKING xi 
(2012). 
45 See, e.g., ENO REPORT, supra note 8, at 20 (estimating that each autonomous vehicle will 
save $250 in annual parking costs). 
46 RAND REPORT, supra note 8, at 26. 
47 See id. at 27 (“AVs could support even greater dispersion of low-density development 
along the outskirts of major metropolitan areas given the ability of owners to engage in other 
activities as vehicles pilot themselves.”). 
48 See Levinson, supra note 40, at 796–97 (“Because they are safer, autonomous vehicles can 
have shorter headways.”), 805–06 (“Fuel costs on the other hand should be lower, as 
autonomous vehicles are likely to be more efficient, both due to less congestion and to more 
optimized driving styles . . . .”); ENO REPORT, supra note 8, at 4–5 (“Under various levels of 
AV adoption congestion savings due to ACC measures and traffic monitoring systems could 
smooth traffic flows by seeking to minimize accelerations and braking in freeway traffic.”); 
CTR. FOR AUTOMOTIVE RES., supra note 42, at 26, 31 (“A transportation system composed 
of self-driving vehicles would decrease energy consumption in at least three primary ways: 
more efficient driving; lighter, more fuel-efficient vehicles; and efficient infrastructure.”). 
49 Kalra Testimony, supra note 25, at 11. This benefit would, of course, require near universal 
adoption of autonomous vehicle technology as crash risks would persist so long as human 
drivers remain on the road. 
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enabling the use of alternative fuels.50 For example, “if the decrease in 
frequency of crashes allows lighter vehicles, many of the range issues that 
have limited the use of electric and other alternative vehicles [would be] 
diminished.”51 Similarly, the ability of autonomous vehicles to drop off 
passengers and then drive to refuel themselves could “permit a viable system 
with fewer refueling stations than would otherwise be required.”52 
 
B. The Current Regulatory Environment for Autonomous Vehicles 
	
The legal environment within which autonomous vehicles and their 
associated benefits must continue to develop remains in a nascent stage. It is 
generally accepted that, absent specific laws or regulations to the contrary, 
autonomous vehicles are legal in the United States.53 Although well over half 
of all states have enacted legislation or issued executive orders related to 
autonomous vehicles, only a fraction of these laws impose or authorize the 
creation of binding regulatory mandates.54 Similarly, the federal government, 
acting through NHTSA, has taken a laissez-faire approach and declined to 
initiate any rulemakings in the area of autonomous vehicle design or 
																																								 																				
50 See RAND REPORT, supra note 8, at 33–36 (considering how autonomous vehicles may 
“enable and accelerate specific competitive aspects of alternative vehicles and fuels”). 
51 Id. at xvi. 
52 Id. at xvi–xvii. One recent study even showed that sharing electronic autonomous vehicles 
could reduce greenhouse gas emissions 87–94 percent by 2030 relative to current 
conventional vehicles. Jeffery B. Greenblatt & Samveg Saxena, Autonomous Taxis Could 
Greatly Reduce Greenhouse-Gas Emissions of US Light-Duty Vehicles, 5 NATURE CLIMATE 
CHANGE 860, 860–62 (2015). But see RAND REPORT, supra note 8, at xvii (“[D]ecreases in 
the cost of driving, and additions to the pool of vehicle users (e.g., elderly, disabled, and 
those under 16)[,] are likely to result in an increase in overall [vehicle miles traveled]. While 
it seems likely that the decline in fuel consumption and emissions would outweigh any such 
increase, it is uncertain.”). 
53 See NHTSA POLICY 2016, supra note 8, at 11 (“[I]f a vehicle is compliant within the existing 
FMVSS regulatory framework and maintains a conventional vehicle design, there is currently no 
specific federal legal barrier to . . . being offered for sale.”); NAT’L HIGHWAY TRANSP. ADMIN., 
Understanding NHTSA’s Regulatory Tools 2 (2016) (“It is important to note that NHTSA does 
not prohibit the introduction of new motor vehicles or motor vehicle technologies into the vehicle 
fleet, provided those vehicles and technologies meet existing FMVSS.”); see also Smith, supra 
note 7, at 516 (conducting an extensive review of existing domestic and international law and 
concluding that autonomous vehicles are most likely legal in the United States). 
54 See Autonomous Vehicles: Self-Driving Vehicle Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Aug. 27, 2018) [hereinafter NCSL List], http://www.ncsl.org/research/transport 
ation/autonomous-vehicles-self-driving-vehicles-enacted-legislation.aspx#Enacted%20Auton 
omous%20Vehicle%20Legislation [https://perma.cc/T37B-3MGU] (listing and providing a 
searchable interface of all proposed and enacted state autonomous vehicle legislation). 
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performance.55 There is, effectively, a blank canvas just starting to be filled 
by federal and state regulators. In the following section, I briefly describe the 
most recent slate of federal regulatory proposals and summarize the 
regulatory actions taken at the state level. 
 
1. Federal Regulation 
	
The federal government has maintained a permissive posture toward 
autonomous vehicle technology.56 In addition to voicing its support and 
aspirations for the widespread commercial adoption of autonomous vehicle 
technology,57 NHTSA has refrained from mandating technology-specific 
design features and performance standards.58 In its most recent policy 
																																								 																				
55 See generally NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEMS 
2.0: A VISION FOR SAFETY ii (2017) [hereinafter NHTSA POLICY 2017] (offering non-binding 
guidance to industry and state actors); NHTSA POLICY 2016, supra note 8 (same); NHTSA 
POLICY 2013, supra note 13 (same). 
56 NHTSA is responsible for regulating vehicle safety and performance. 49 U.S.C. § 30111 (“The 
Secretary of Transportation shall prescribe motor vehicle safety standards.”); 49 U.S.C. § 
30102(a)(9) (“‘[M]otor vehicle safety’ means the performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle 
equipment in a way that protects the public against unreasonable risk of accidents occurring 
because of the design, construction, or performance of a motor vehicle, and against unreasonable 
risk of death or injury in an accident, and includes nonoperational safety of a motor vehicle.”); 49 
U.S.C. § 30102(a)(10) (“‘[M]otor vehicle safety standard’ means a minimum standard for motor 
vehicle or motor vehicle equipment performance.”). Traditionally, states have been responsible for 
regulating other aspects of vehicle operation. See Stephen P. Wood et al., The Potential Regulatory 
Challenges of Increasingly Autonomous Motor Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1423, 1435 
(2012) (“[NHTSA] does not regulate the actions of vehicle owners, the operation of motor vehicles 
on public roads, or the maintenance and repair of vehicles-in-use.”); see also NHTSA POLICY 
2017, supra note 55, at 20 (“State[ ] responsibilities [include] . . . licensing human drivers and 
registering motors vehicles in their jurisdictions; enacting and enforcing traffic laws and 
regulations; conducting safety inspections . . . ; [and] regulating motor vehicle insurance and 
liability.”). Although the distinction between the vehicle and its driver is increasingly blurred in the 
context of autonomous vehicles, NHTSA has signaled its intent to maintain exclusive control over 
vehicle design and performance. Id. (“DOT strongly encourages States to allow DOT alone to 
regulate the safety design and performance aspects of ADS technology. If a State does pursue ADS 
performance-related regulations, that State should consult with NHTSA.”). 
57 See, e.g., NHTSA POLICY 2017, supra note 55, at ii (“[A]utomated vehicle technologies possess 
the potential to save thousands of lives, as well as reduce congestion, enhance mobility, and 
improve productivity. The Federal Government wants to ensure it does not impede progress with 
unnecessary or unintended barriers to innovation.”); NHTSA POLICY 2016, supra note 8, at 6 
(“Recognizing [their] great potential, this Policy sets out an ambitious approach to accelerate the 
[autonomous vehicle] revolution.”); NHTSA POLICY 2013, supra note 13, at 1 (reflecting a 
similar sentiment). 
58 See NHTSA POLICY 2017, supra note 55, at ii, 2 (reaffirming NHTSA’s commitment to a 
“nonregulatory approach” to autonomous vehicle safety and offering “recommendations and 
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statement,59 the agency offered a “nonregulatory approach” to autonomous 
vehicle safety.60 To that end, the document outlined 12 vehicle performance 
guidelines for industry participants to “consider” as they develop, test, and 
deploy autonomous vehicles on public roadways.61 The guidelines cover 
broad categories such as “system safety,” “human machine interface,” and 
“crashworthiness.”62 Although NHTSA encouraged industry participants to 
submit a “Safety Self-Assessment” describing their treatment of each 
guideline, it emphasized that doing so is “entirely voluntary” and that there 
is no “compliance or enforcement mechanism” for its recommendations.63 
In short, the policy statement signaled to industry participants that they are 
free to engage in “testing [and] deployment” without any pre-approval from 
the agency.64 
																																								 																				
suggestions” to industry and state actors); NHTSA POLICY 2016, supra note 8, at 6, 11 
(emphasizing NHTSA’s use of “agency guidance rather than . . . rulemaking” and that, although 
elements of the guidance may become binding in the future, it is “not [presently] mandatory”); 
see also William J. Kohler & Alex Colbert-Taylor, Current Law and Potential Legal Issues 
Pertaining to Automated, Autonomous, and Connected Vehicles, 31 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. 
L.J. 99, 105 (2015) (“[T]he U.S. federal government has not attempted to regulate autonomous 
motor vehicles as such.”). 
59 The prior policy statements were published in 2013 and 2016. See NHTSA POLICY 2016, 
supra note 8 (updating the 2013 policy); NHTSA POLICY 2013, supra note 13 (articulating 
the first federal policy). 
60 NHTSA POLICY 2017, supra note 55, at ii. 
61 Id. at 2. 
62 Id. at 5, 10, 12. 
63 Id. at 2, 16. Although the new guidance does not materially change any existing elements 
of federal policy toward autonomous vehicles—a policy which has always been premised on 
voluntary compliance—it does change the trajectory of that policy. In 2016, for example, 
NHTSA looked poised to mandate autonomous vehicle-specific safety standards and the 
submission of self-assessments. See NHTSA POLICY 2016, supra note 8, at 100 (identifying 
as “next steps” the mandatory “submission of [a] Safety Assessment” and promulgation of 
“a new FMVSS”). The new guidance, however, makes clear that NHTSA does not intend to 
pursue either measure. The new guidance also abandons four proposed changes to NHTSA’s 
statutory authorities and internal processes, including a pre-market approval process. See id. 
at 63-82 (describing “regulatory tools and authorities . . . [with] potential to facilitate the 
expeditious and safe introduction of [automated vehicles]”). The 2017 guidance thus sends 
a clear message that NHTSA intends to act as an aggregator of best practices and post-market 
safety net, not a hands-on participant in the pre-market design process. 
64 NHTSA POLICY 2017, supra note 55, at 16 (“NHTSA does not require that entities provide 
submissions nor are they required to delay testing or deployment. Assessments are not subject to 
Federal approval.”); see also Adam Thierer & Jennifer Huddleston Skees, Big Questions About 
NHTSA’s “Soft Law” Driverless Cars Guidance, PLAIN TEXT (Sept. 13, 2017), https:// 
readplaintext.com/big-questions-about-nhtsas-soft-law-driverless-cars-guidance-e9da327a7522 
[https://perma.cc/KMQ8-ZYMQ] (“[T]he agency had previously hinted that it might consider a 
‘pre-market approval approach — used either in conjunction with or as a replacement for DOT’s 
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The lack of technology-specific regulations, however, does not mean that 
autonomous vehicles are unregulated at the federal level. To the contrary, 
NHTSA has been careful to remind manufacturers that they must comply with 
existing mandates applicable to conventional vehicles.65 Under the National 
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act,66 the agency uses notice and comment 
rulemaking to create design, construction, and performance standards, known as 
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS), applicable to all motor 
vehicles.67 A manufacturer must self-certify compliance with each applicable 
standard absent a specific exemption from the agency.68 Although NHTSA lacks 
the authority to pre-approve or block new vehicle designs or technologies before 
they come to market, it may test commercially available vehicles and pursue 
enforcement actions if a vehicle fails to meet an applicable FMVSS.69 In addition, 
NHTSA may order a vehicle or equipment recall if it identifies a “defect” posing 
an “unreasonable risk to safety.”70 This authority applies “notwithstanding the 
																																								 																				
existing self-certification and compliance testing process.’ But that suggestion has now been 
abandoned . . . .”). 
65 See NHTSA POLICY 2017, supra note 55, at 3 (“NHTSA has broad enforcement authority 
to address existing and new automotive technologies and equipment.”); NHTSA POLICY 
2016, supra note 8, at 7 (“NHTSA will continue to exercise its available regulatory authority 
over [autonomous vehicles] using its existing regulatory tools . . . .”); NHTSA Enforcement 
Guidance Bulletin 2016–02: Safety-Related Defects and Automated Safety Technologies, 81 
Fed. Reg. 65,706 (Sept. 23, 2016) [hereinafter NHTSA Enforcement Bulletin] (“[T]his 
Guidance aims to increase awareness of NHTSA’s enforcement authority over motor vehicle 
equipment in all of its various forms.”). 
66 Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (1966) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 30101 et seq.) 
67 See 49 U.S.C. § 30111 (“The Secretary of Transportation shall prescribe motor vehicle 
safety standards.”); 49 C.F.R. § 553 (2017) (listing procedures for adopting rules); see also 
NHTSA POLICY 2016, supra note 8, at 49 (“Notice-and-comment rulemaking is the tool the 
Agency uses to adopt new standards, modify existing standards, or repeal an existing 
standard.”). The FMVSS are codified at 49 C.F.R. §§ 571.101–571.500. 
68 See 49 U.S.C. § 30115 (describing the self-certification process); 49 U.S.C. §§ 30113-30114 
(describing the circumstances under which temporary exemptions may be granted). In addition 
to exemptions, the public may also request a letter of interpretation from NHTSA. See NAT’L 
HIGHWAY TRANSPORTATION ADMIN., Understanding NHTSA’s Regulatory Tools 2–3 (2016). 
Interpretation letters and rulings on exemptions have “historically . . . taken several months to 
several years” for the agency to issue. NHTSA POLICY 2016, supra note 8, at 49. 
69 See 49 U.S.C. § 30112(a); see also NHTSA Enforcement Bulletin, supra note 65, at 65,707 
(stating that NHTSA’s enforcement authority under the National Traffic Safety and Motor 
Vehicle Act “includes investigations, administrative proceedings, civil penalties, and other civil 
enforcement actions”).  
70 NHTSA Enforcement Bulletin, supra note 65, at 65, 707–08 (explaining how NHTSA 
determines whether a defect exists and, if so, whether it poses an unreasonable risk to safety); 
see also 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(3) (defining “defect,” in a circular fashion, as any “defect in 
performance, construction, a component, or material of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle 
equipment”); 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(9) (defining “motor vehicle safety” as an “unreasonable 
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presence or absence of an FMVSS.”71 Thus, as applied to autonomous vehicles, 
NHTSA has the authority to create and enforce FMVSS and, separately, to recall 
vehicles that otherwise pose an “unreasonable risk to safety.”72  
As of the time of this writing, Congress is also considering two pieces of 
autonomous vehicle legislation.73 Under both, lawmakers would largely codify 
the existing federal policy on autonomous vehicles. The SELF DRIVE Act, 
which already passed in the House of Representatives, gives NHTSA 1 year to 
issue a “rule-making and safety priority plan” outlining, “as necessary,” any 
technology-specific amendments and additions to the FMVSS.74 The AV 
START Act, currently pending in the Senate, would require one-time 
recommendations within 5 years from a “Highly Automated Vehicles Technical 
Committee,” after which NHTSA would have 1 year to consider and promulgate 
any technology-specific amendments or additions to the FMVSS.75 In the interim, 
both proposals would allow vehicle testing to move forward and authorize 
NHTSA to grant manufacturers at least 80,000 exemptions from existing 
FMVSS.76 The bills would also require manufacturers to submit some version of 
the “Voluntary Safety Self-Assessment” described in NHTSA’s 2017 policy 
statement, though prohibit any adverse action based thereupon.77 Notably, neither 
																																								 																				
risk of accidents” or “unreasonable risk of death or injury in an accident”); 49 U.S.C. § 
30118(b) (requiring a recall if NHTSA identifies a “defect related to motor vehicle safety”). 
71  NHTSA Enforcement Bulletin, supra note 65, at 65,707 (citing United States v. Chrysler 
Corp., 158 F.3d 1350, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). Notably, NHTSA’s recall authority does not 
authorize it to order immediate mitigation measures by the manufacturer. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 
30118, 30120 (describing the recall authority). 
72 See NHTSA POLICY 2017, supra note 55, at 20 (explaining that NHTSA is authorized to 
“enforc[e] compliance with FMVSSs” and oversee the “recall and remedy of . . . safety-related 
vehicle defects” for autonomous vehicles); NHTSA POLICY 2016, supra note 8, at 48 (stating that 
NHTSA will treat autonomous vehicles like conventional vehicles and “pursue[] enforcement 
actions when the Agency finds either a non-compliance [with FMVSS] or a defect posing an 
unreasonable risk to safety”); NHTSA Enforcement Bulletin, supra note 65, at 65,708 (same). 
73 See SELF DRIVE Act, H.R. 3388, 115th Cong. (2017) (regulating “the safety of highly 
automated vehicles”); AV START Act, S. 1885, 115th Cong. (2017) (supporting “the 
development of highly automated vehicle safety technologies”). For a side-by-side comparison 
of the two pieces of legislation, see Section-by-Section Comparison of House and Senate 
Autonomous Vehicle Bills, ENO CTR. FOR TRANSP. (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.enotrans.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/AV-Bill-SBS-Senate-Reported.pdf?x43122. 
74 H.R. 3388, 115th Cong. § 4 (2017).  
75 S. 1885, 115th Cong. §§ 10(d)(3), 11(b) (2017). The bill would require a more expedient 
review and resolution of any conflicts between existing FMVSS and autonomous vehicle 
technologies. See id. § 4. 
76 See H.R. 3388, 115th Cong. § 6 (2017) (providing for up to 100,000 exemptions); S. 1885, 
115th Cong. § 6 (2017) (providing for up to 80,000 exemptions). 
77 See H.R. 3388, 115th Cong. § 4 (2017) (directing NHTSA to promulgate a rule requiring 
submission of “safety assessment certifications” and, in the interim, mandating submission 
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law would change the process by which the agency establishes or revises its rules 
governing vehicle design and performance. NHTSA’s recall authority would also 
remain untouched. Although increasing the number of exemptions could make 
the system more flexible, FMVSS exemptions operate on a case-by-case basis. 
 
2. State Regulation  
 
Most states have also taken a hands-off approach to regulating the safety 
and operation of autonomous vehicles. Although 35 states and the District of 
Columbia have enacted legislation or issued an executive order related to 
autonomous vehicles,78 many of these laws simply call for the study of 
autonomous vehicles,79 establish advisory committees,80 or consider narrow 
applications of automated technology.81 Only a fraction of the enacted state laws 
impose specific regulatory mandates,82 instruct state agencies to promulgate 
																																								 																				
of the Safety Self-Assessment contemplated by the agency’s 2017 policy statement); S. 1885, 
115th Cong. § 9 (2017) (requiring a “safety evaluation report” and describing its content). 
78 See NCSL List, supra note 54 (listing proposed and enacted autonomous vehicle laws by state). 
79 See H.R. 1065, 64th Leg. Assemb. (N.D. 2015) (commissioning a study about the benefits of 
automated motor vehicles and requesting recommendations for policy changes); Exec. Order No. 
18-04 (Minn. 2018) (establishing an “Advisory Council” to “study, assess, and prepare for the 
transformation and opportunities associated with the widespread adoption of automated and 
connected vehicles” and “develop recommendations for changes in state law, rules, and policies”). 
80 See H.B. 4063, 79th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2018) (establishing a task force on 
autonomous vehicles); H. 494, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2017) (convening a meeting of 
automated vehicle experts); Exec. Order No. 2018-01 (Idaho 2018) (creating the 
“Autonomous and Connected Vehicle Testing and Deployment Committee”); Exec. Order 
245 (Wis. 2018) (forming the “Steering Committee on Autonomous and Connected Vehicle 
testing and Deployment” to review current laws and identify areas for improvement). 
81 See, e.g., S.B. 125, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2018) (addressing the platooning of 
autonomous trucks); H.B. 1290, 120th Gen Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2018) (same); S.B. 
116, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2018) (same); H.B. 1343, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2018) 
(same); H.B. 1754, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017) (same); H. 3289, 122d Gen. 
Assemb. (S.C. 2017) (same); H.B. 373, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2015) (same). 
82 See A.B. 9508, 241st Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018) (requiring, for example, “that a natural 
person holding a valid license for the operation of the motor vehicle's class be present within such 
vehicle for the duration of the time it is operated on public highways”); Exec. Order No. 2018-
04K (Ohio 2018) (requiring, for example, “a designated operator” for all autonomous vehicles in 
the state); S.B. 260, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2017) (requiring, for example, that any 
autonomous test vehicle be operated by a person “seated in the driver’s seat” and “capable of 
taking immediate manual control”); Council 19-643, Council Period 20 (D.C. 2013) (mandating 
that autonomous vehicles comply with traffic laws, possess a manual override feature, and have 
a driver present); Exec. Order No. 17-02 (Wash. 2017) (outlining different requirements for 
autonomous vehicles based on whether or not human operators are present); Exec. Order No. 572 
(Mass. 2016) (requiring, for example, that autonomous test vehicles have “a human being . . . in 
the driver’s seat”); see also A.B. 69, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2017) (allowing for the operation 
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such mandates,83 or expressly authorize autonomous vehicle operation.84 
These laws, at least as they pertain to vehicle design and operation, can be 
divided into roughly three categories: (1) laws which mandate specific design 
features and limit the operation of autonomous vehicles,85 (2) laws which limit 
the operation of autonomous vehicles but do not mandate specific design 
features,86 and (3) laws which expressly authorize the operation of autonomous 
vehicles with varying degrees of oversight.87 Notably, as at the federal level, 
																																								 																				
of fully autonomous vehicles, but imposing strict design requirements on partially automated 
vehicles). Some of the laws regarding autonomous truck platoons, listed supra note 81, also 
include specific regulatory mandates. See, e.g., S.B. 116, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2018) (“An 
appropriately endorsed driver who holds a valid commercial driver's license shall be present 
behind the wheel of each commercial motor vehicle in a platoon.”).  
83 See H.P. 1204, 128th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Me. 2018) (instructing the Commissioner of 
Transportation to promulgate rules governing autonomous vehicle testing and empowering her 
to prohibit any testing which she deems a threat to public safety); Exec. Order No. 572 (Mass. 
2016) (instructing the Department of Transportation to “issue guidance” to allow for the safe 
testing of automated vehicles). Some of the laws regarding autonomous truck platoons, listed 
supra note 81, also delegate regulatory authority. See, e.g., S.B. 116, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Ky. 2018) (directing the Kentucky Department of Vehicle Regulation to “promulgate 
administrative regulations . . . set[ting] forth procedures for platooning, including required 
elements of a platooning plan”).  
84 See L.B. 989, 105th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2018) (authorizing cities to conduct pilot 
projects to test autonomous vehicles); S.B. 2205, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017) (“A 
political subdivision of this state or a state agency may not impose a . . . regulation related to 
the operation of an automated motor vehicle or automated driving system.”); S.B. 17-213, 
71st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2017) (authorizing persons to use “automated 
driving system[s]”); S.B. 219, 154th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2017) (allowing 
persons to “operate a fully autonomous vehicle with the automated driving system engaged 
without a human driver being present in the vehicle”); H.B. 791, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Ill. 2017) (forbidding local governments from “prohibiting the use of Automated 
Driving System equipped vehicles”); S.B. 995, 98th Leg. (Mich. 2016) (allowing operation 
of autonomous vehicles without a human driver present); S.B. 0598, 109th Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2015) (same); H.B. 1207, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012) (“A person 
who possesses a valid driver license may operate an autonomous vehicle in autonomous 
mode.”); Exec. Order No. 2018-04 (Ariz. 2018) (allowing “operation of self-driving vehicles 
. . . with, or without, a person present”); H.B. 469, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2017) 
(authorizing “the operation of fully autonomous motor vehicles” by persons without a 
driver’s license).  
85 See infra notes 88–92 and accompanying text (listing and detailing this first category of 
laws, including those from Connecticut, New York, Massachusetts, Nevada, and the District 
of Columbia). 
86 See infra notes 93–97 and accompanying text (listing and detailing this second category 
of laws, including those from Maine, Washington, and Ohio).  
87 See infra notes 97–102 and accompanying text (listing and detailing this third category of 
laws, including those from California, Colorado, Georgia, Nebraska, North Carolina, Texas, 
Arizona, Michigan, Florida, and Tennessee).  
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no state has altered the way in which it approaches motor vehicle regulation, 
leaving the processes by which state legislatures and agencies establish and 
revise the rules governing autonomous vehicles unchanged from those 
applicable to traditional vehicles. 
The first category of laws includes Connecticut, New York, 
Massachusetts, Nevada, and the District of Columbia. Although the testing of 
autonomous vehicles is permitted in each locality, all but Nevada mandate that 
a licensed human driver be present and capable of taking manual control of an 
autonomous vehicle at all times.88 This mandate effectively requires that every 
autonomous vehicle be equipped with a steering wheel, accelerator, and brake 
pedal.89 Nevada permits the unrestricted testing and deployment of fully 
autonomous vehicles without a human driver, but requires that all other 
automated vehicle designs contain an “accessible” means to “engage and 
disengage the automated driving system,” an indicator of whether the 
automated driving system is engaged, and a system to alert the human operator 
if “a failure of the automated driving system occurs.”90 Connecticut, New 
York, and Massachusetts further limit who may test an autonomous vehicle91 
and under what circumstances.92 
																																								 																				
88 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 13a-260(d)(1) (requiring that a human operator “be seated in the 
driver’s seat” and “capable of taking immediate manual control”); D.C. CODE § 50-2352(2) 
(requiring that a human driver be “seated in the control seat of the vehicle while in operation 
[and be] prepared to take control of the autonomous vehicle at any moment”); A.B. 9508, 
part H § 1, 241st Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018) (enacted) (requiring that a “natural person . . 
. be present within [the] vehicle for the duration of the time it is operated on public 
highways”); Exec. Order No. 572 § 4 (Mass. 2016) (requiring a “human being” be seated in 
“the driver’s seat or other location in the vehicle” where she “can take immediate control of 
the vehicle if necessary”). 
89 These design features are explicitly required under D.C. law and implicitly required under 
Connecticut, New York, and Massachusetts law. 
90 NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.080(2)(a)–(b). 
91 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 13a-260(d)(1)(D) (limiting vehicle operators to an “employee, 
independent contractor or other person designated and trained by the autonomous vehicle 
tester”);A.B. 9508, part H § 1, 241st Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018) (enacted) (requiring vehicle 
operators to hold a valid driver’s license); Exec. Order No. 572 § 2 (Mass. 2016) (limiting 
testing of autonomous vehicles to “companies in the [autonomous vehicle] sector”). Until 
recently, the District of Columbia also limited who could test autonomous vehicles. See D.C. 
MUN. REGS. tit. 18, § 114 (repealed 2018) (limiting vehicle operators to those who hold a 
special autonomous vehicle license). 
92 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 13a-260(c) (restricting testing to agreed upon “locations and 
routes”); A.B. 9508, part H § 1, 241st Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018) (enacted) (requiring 
“demonstrations and tests shall only take place . . . in a form and manner prescribed by the 
superintendent of the New York state police”); Exec. Order No. 572 § 4 (Mass. 2016) 
(requiring a demonstration that the vehicle can be “operated without undue risk to public 
safety”).   
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The second category of laws is limited to Maine, Washington, and 
Ohio. Maine restricts autonomous vehicle operation to “pilot projects” pre-
approved by a Highly Automated Vehicles Advisory Committee.93 The 
duration of each project is limited and approval contingent on a cost-benefit 
analysis conducted by the Advisory Committee.94 Similarly, an executive order 
issued by Governor John Kasich of Ohio limits autonomous vehicle operation 
to “testing and pilot programs” and requires registration with the Department 
of Transportation prior to operation.95 The state also requires that companies 
submit a safety self-evaluation and designate “an employee, contractor, or 
agent” to “actively monitor the [autonomous] vehicle at all times.”96 Finally, 
Washington permits the operation of autonomous vehicles which are “capable” 
of complying with “relevant” state motor vehicle laws, but only as part of a 
“pilot program” and by “entities that that are developing autonomous vehicle 
technology equipment.”97 
The final category of laws includes California, Colorado, Georgia, 
Nebraska, North Carolina, Texas, Arizona, Michigan, Florida, and Tennessee. 
In all ten states, the testing and deployment of fully autonomous vehicles is 
expressly permitted and members of the public may operate or facilitate the 
operation of an automated vehicle.98 Tennessee, Colorado, North Carolina, and 
																																								 																				
93 Exec. Order No. 2018–001 at 3 (Me. 2018). 
94 See id. (instructing the committee to “assess the purpose(s) of proposed Pilot Projects, 
including their benefits for the traveling public and their value for the advancement of HAV 
technologies in the State of Maine” and to weigh these factors against “public safety”). 
95 Exec. Order No. 2018–04K §§ 1, 3 (Ohio 2018). 
96 Id. §§ 5–6. 
97 Exec. Order No. 17–02 at 2–3 (Wash. 2017). 
98 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-242(1) (2017) (“A person may use an automated driving 
system to drive a motor vehicle or to control a function of a motor vehicle . . . .”); FLA. STAT. 
§ 316.85 (2018) (“A person who possesses a valid driver license may operate an autonomous 
vehicle in autonomous mode on roads in this state if the vehicle is equipped with autonomous 
technology . . . .”); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-8-11(a) (2018) (“A person may operate a fully 
autonomous vehicle with the automated driving system engaged without a human driver 
being present in the vehicle . . . .”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.665b(3)(a) (2018) (permitting 
a “motor vehicle manufacturer” to make available on-demand autonomous motor vehicles 
for members of the public); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60–3302 (2018) (“A driverless-capable 
vehicle may operate on the public roads of this state without a conventional human driver 
physically present in the vehicle . . . .”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-401(h) (2018) (“A person 
may operate a fully autonomous vehicle . . . .”);TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 55–30–103 (2018) 
(“An ADS-operated vehicle may drive or operate on streets and highways in this state with 
the ADS engaged without a human driver physically present in the vehicle . . . .”); TEX. 
TRANSP. CODE § 545.454 (a) (2017) (“An automated motor vehicle may operate in this state 
with the automated driving system engaged, regardless of whether a human operator is 
physically present in the vehicle.”); Exec. Order No. 2018-04 § 3 (Ariz. 2018) (“Testing or 
operation of vehicles on public roads . . . shall be allowed . . . .”); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, 
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Texas even prohibit cities and municipalities from banning or limiting the use 
of autonomous vehicles within their boundaries.99 All but Florida, Colorado, 
Nebraska, and Texas require that vehicle owners notify state regulators prior 
to operating on public roads,100 and all but Florida mandate that vehicles 
comply with existing state and federal regulations.101 Interestingly, despite 
																																								 																				
§ 228.00 (2018) (allowing autonomous vehicles to be “deployed on public roads in 
California”). 
99 TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-8-202(a) (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42–4–110(b) (2018); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 20-401(i) (2018); TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 545.452(b) (2017). 
100 See GA. CODE ANN. § 40-8-11(a)(5) (2018) (requiring that each vehicle be “registered” 
and be “identified on such registration as a fully autonomous vehicle”); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 257.665b(3)(a) (2018) (“The motor vehicle manufacturer may commence a SAVE project 
at any time after it notifies the department that it has self-certified as provided in subsection 
(1).”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-401(h)(5) (2018) (requiring that each vehicle be “registered” 
and “identified on the registration and registration card as a fully autonomous vehicle”); 
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 55-30-103 (2018) (“In order for a manufacturer to participate in a 
SAVE project, it must submit a letter to the department prior to operating any ADS-operated 
vehicles on the public roads or highways.”); Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2018–04 § 3 (requiring 
that each owner of an autonomous vehicle, “prior to commencing testing or operation, . . . 
submit[ ] a written statement to the Arizona Department of Transportation” self-certifying 
compliance with the executive order); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 228.06(a) (2018) (“[A]n 
autonomous vehicle shall not be deployed on any public road in California until the 
manufacturer has submitted and the department has approved an Application for a Permit to 
Deploy Autonomous Vehicles on Public Streets . . . .”). 
101 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-242(1) (2017) (requiring that each vehicle be “capable of 
complying with every state and federal law that applies to the function that the system is 
operating”); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-8-11(a)(1) (2018) (requiring that each vehicle be “capable 
of being operated in compliance with [the rules of the road] and has been, at the time of its 
manufacture, certified by the manufacturer as being in compliance with applicable federal 
motor vehicle safety standards”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.665b(1)(c)-(d) (2018) (requiring 
that each vehicle comply “with all applicable state and federal laws” and be “capable of being 
operated in compliance with applicable traffic and motor vehicle laws of this state”); NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 60-3303(2) (2018) (“The automated driving system feature, while engaged, 
shall be designed to operate . . . in compliance with the Nebraska Rules of the Road . . . .”); 
TENN. CODE ANN.  §§ 55-30-103(1) (2018) (requiring that each vehicle comply with “all 
applicable state and federal laws” and be “capable of being operated in compliance with 
applicable traffic and motor vehicle laws of this state”); TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 545.454(b)(1), 
(3) (2017) (requiring that each vehicle be “capable of operating in compliance with 
applicable traffic and motor vehicle laws of this state” and “equipped with an automated 
driving system in compliance with applicable federal law and federal motor vehicle safety 
standards”); Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2018-04 § 3(a), (c) (requiring that each vehicle comply 
with “all applicable federal law and federal motor vehicle safety standards,” as well as be 
“capable of complying with all applicable [state] traffic and motor vehicle safety laws and 
regulations”); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 228.06(8)–(9) (2018) (“[T]he manufacturer shall 
certify that the autonomous technology meets Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards [and] 
. . . that the autonomous technology is designed to detect and respond to roadway situations 
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mandating compliance with existing state laws, only Michigan, Colorado, and 
Texas expressly clarify that autonomous vehicles are deemed to satisfy all 
traffic and motor vehicle laws which reference the presence of a driver or 
physical acts performed by a driver.102 
 
II. THE CHALLENGE OF REGULATING AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES AND 
OTHER RAPIDLY EVOLVING TECHNOLOGIES 
 
Despite the potential economic, social, and environmental benefits 
outlined in Part I, autonomous vehicles face a number of obstacles to 
widespread commercial adoption. One of the most significant sources of 
potential friction is the evolving legal and regulatory environment within 
which autonomous vehicles must continue to develop and operate. Although 
regulation can help to facilitate the commercial success of emerging 
technologies, as well as manage potential risks, it also has potential 
drawbacks.103 In discussing the ways in which the present and future 
regulation of autonomous vehicles may impede their development, this Part 
proceeds in two sections. In the first, I outline the inherent challenge of 
regulating rapidly evolving technologies like autonomous vehicles and divide 
common regulatory responses to this challenge into three categories. In doing 
so, I draw on Part I of the article to highlight how all three responses are 
reflected in both existing and proposed state and federal approaches to 
regulating autonomous vehicles. In the second section, I then analyze the 
potential barriers to commercial adoption of new technologies inherent in 
																																								 																				
in compliance with all provisions of the California Vehicle Code and local regulation 
applicable to the performance of the dynamic driving task in the vehicle’s operational design 
domain . . . .”). 
102 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.665b(4) (2018) (“When engaged, an automated driving 
system or any remote or expert-controlled assist activity shall be considered the driver or 
operator of the vehicle for purposes of determining conformance to any applicable traffic or 
motor vehicle laws and shall be deemed to satisfy electronically all physical acts required by 
a driver or operator of the vehicle.”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-242(1) (2017) (“Any 
provision . . . that by its nature regulates a human driver . . . does not apply to an automated 
driving system, except for laws regulating the physical driving of a vehicle.”); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 60-3306 (2018) (“[T]he Nebraska Rules of the Road shall not be construed as 
requiring a conventional human driver to operate a driverless-capable vehicle that is being 
operated by an automated driving system, and the automated driving system of such vehicle, 
when engaged, shall be deemed to fulfill any physical acts required of a conventional human 
driver to perform the dynamic driving task.”); TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 545.453(a)(1)–(2) 
(2017) (clarifying that “the automated driving system is considered to be licensed to operate 
the vehicle” and that “the owner of the automated driving system is considered the operator 
of the automated motor vehicle solely for the purpose of assessing compliance with 
applicable traffic or motor vehicle laws”). 
103 See supra notes 11-13 (highlighting the potential benefits and drawbacks of regulation). 
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each regulatory response and consider the ways in which employing each 
type of approach could adversely impact autonomous vehicles. 
 
A.  The Pacing Problem and Potential Regulatory Responses to the Problem 
 
One of the main challenges of regulating emerging technologies like 
autonomous vehicles is the incongruous rates at which law and technology 
sometimes evolve. The following section describes both the inherent obstacles 
to adaptation of new and existing regulations to rapid technological change and 
the way in which uncertainty and the inertia of U.S. legal institutions give rise to 
three common regulatory responses: precaution, inaction, and proactivity. 
 
1. Why U.S. Legal Institutions Struggle to Keep Up with New 
Technologies 
	
A growing body of literature explores the difficulties faced by regulatory 
frameworks as they attempt to evolve concurrently with the technologies which 
they target.104 This phenomenon, labeled by one commentator as the “pacing 
problem,”105 captures the recurring tension between the limited reactive and 
adaptive capacity of U.S. legal institutions and the increasingly fluid nature of 
emerging technologies.106 At the heart of this tension are several characteristics 
of traditional sources of regulation—legislatures, administrative agencies, and 
courts—which can make it difficult, if not impossible, for the law to keep pace 
with rapidly changing technologies.107 
 
a. Legislatures 
 
The limited reactive and adaptive capacity of U.S. legal institutions is 
particularly pronounced in the legislative process. Legislatures are the most 
																																								 																				
104 See supra notes 4-6 (surveying this literature). 
105 Marchant, supra note 15. Other scholars have described this same problem using different labels 
and metaphors, but Professor Marchant’s account is the most recent and salient. See, e.g., ROGER 
BROWNSWORD, RIGHTS, REGULATION AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 160–61 (2008) 
(defining the problem as one of “regulatory connection”); Michael Kirby, Medical Technology and 
New Frontiers of Family Law, 1 AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 196, 212 (1987) (describing the law as a tortoise 
and technology as a hare). It also provides the jumping off point for this analysis. 
106 See supra notes 4–5 (describing the accelerating rate of technological change and the 
increasingly limited capacity of legal institutions to adapt and shape outcomes). 
107 This is not to suggest that U.S. legal institutions can never and do not ever keep pace with 
technological change; rather, it is meant to highlight the features of U.S. legal institutions which 
can and frequently do create gaps. In addition, some commentators have suggested that the speed 
at which technology is currently evolving is more rapid than at previous moments in history. 
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powerful and fundamental lawmaking unit within the U.S. political system. 
Congress and state legislatures possess a wide range of tools with which to 
regulate new and emerging technologies, including the delegation of 
regulatory authority to administrative bodies,108 the creation of specialized 
courts,109 and the passage of new legislation.110 Nevertheless, despite these 
inherent capabilities, the rate at which legislatures operate is constrained both 
by design and political circumstance.  
At the federal level, constitutional and statutory language impose a 
number of structural and procedural requirements which deliberately “slow 
legislative decision making and distance it from the immediacy of legislators’ 
and various constituencies’ passions and desires.”111 Article I of the U.S. 
Constitution, for example, requires that proposed legislation be debated and 
approved by both houses of Congress,112 after which any approved legislation 
must be presented to the president for his signature or veto.113 As James 
Madison and Alexander Hamilton outlined in The Federalist Papers, these 
																																								 																				
108 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372–73 (1989) (reaffirming congressional 
power to delegate rulemaking authority to agencies if there is an “intelligible principle” upon 
which an agency may base its actions); Separation of Powers—Delegation of Legislative 
Power, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-
legislatures/delegation-of-legislative-power.aspx [https://perma.cc/HYZ5-CHXF] (describ-
ing state approaches to legislative delegations of authority). 
109 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing that the “judicial Power” of the United States shall 
be “vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time 
to time ordain and establish”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“Congress shall have Power to . . . 
constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court . . . .”); Markus B. Zimmer, Overview of 
Specialized Courts, INT’L J. FOR CT. ADMIN., 1, 1, 7–13 (2009) (discussing specialized state 
and federal courts). 
110 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 8 (vesting “[a]ll legislative Powers . . . in a Congress” and 
enumerating its powers). 
111 Eric Lane, Men Are Not Angels: The Realpolitik of Direct Democracy and What We Can 
Do About It, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 579, 598-99 (1998); see also Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, The 
Puzzling Resistance to Judicial Review of the Legislative Process, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1915, 
1933 (2011) (“One of the important purposes of procedural rules such as bicameral passage, 
discussion in committee, and three readings is precisely to slow down the legislative process 
and to make legislation an arduous and deliberate process. These rules ensure, inter alia, that 
laws will not change too frequently or too hastily . . . .”) (footnotes omitted); John O. 
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REV. 
703, 771 (2002) (“[T]he Framers saw that bicameralism had the potential to reduce the 
influence of excessive political passion and the power of special-interest groups, thereby 
improving the quality of legislation.”). 
112 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
113 Id.; see also McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 111, at 715 (“The President’s veto power 
has the effect of making the President a third legislative house, turning our system into one 
of tricameralism.”). 
Vol. 4:1]       Autonomous Vehicles: Problems and Principles for Future Regulation 
 
 
105 
features of the lawmaking process are designed as a deliberate anchor against 
precipitous change.114 In addition, internal rules of congressional procedure—
such as the requirement that proposed legislation be reviewed in committee115 
and that all legislation be read three times prior to passage116—serve a similar 
purpose.117 Many of these same structural and procedural constraints are 
reflected in state legislative processes.118 
In addition to the designed constraints on legislative efficiency, political 
circumstance also places a check on the reactive and adaptive capacity of 
legislatures. Congress and state legislatures are often faced with more issues than 
time or resources allow them to address.119 As Professor John W. Kingdon 
famously argued, policy issues are unlikely to receive attention outside of brief 
“policy windows” when political feasibility, social urgency, and mature policy 
solutions combine to allow for legislative action.120 Although the combination 
of these factors permits new laws to be enacted or old laws to be adapted during 
an open window, it may be years before political conditions allow lawmakers to 
revisit the same issue during a new window.121 Moreover, the potential inability 
of a single political party to control the presidency and both houses of Congress 
simultaneously may create even larger gaps between these windows. There is 
already anecdotal evidence to this effect, as the three most recent terms of 
Congress, both characterized by significant political discord between and within 
the legislative and executive branches, each produced fewer laws than any other 
term since 1948, when congressional productivity was first measured.122  
																																								 																				
114 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 378 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“To 
trace the mischievous effects of a mutable government would fill a volume.”). 
115 See Standing Rules of the Senate, R. XVII(3)(a); Rules of the House of Representatives, 
R. XII(2)(a). 
116 See Standing Rules of the Senate, R. XIV(2); Rules of the House of Representatives, R. 
XVI(8)(a)-(c). 
117 See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121 HARV. 
L. REV. 543, 552-57 (2007) (describing the “significant effect[]” internal rules of procedure 
have on the pace of legislative action). 
118 See, e.g., How a Bill Becomes Law: Michigan Legislature, MICH. LEGISLATIVE SERV. 
BUREAU, http://www.legislature.mi.gov/publications/howbillbecomeslaw.pdf (last visited 
March 3, 2017) (describing the procedural requirements for Michigan state laws, including 
that each bill be read three times and reviewed in committee prior to becoming law). 
119 See Gary E. Marchant et al., What Does the History of Technology Regulation Teach Us About 
Nano Oversight?, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 724, 726 (2009) (“Congress is handcuffed by the 
synergistic effect of an impossibly large number of important issues needing attention mixed with 
partisan gridlock, making prompt action on any but the most urgent or symbolic issues unlikely.”). 
120 See generally JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (1984). 
121 Id. 
122 See Ezra Klein, Goodbye and Good Riddance, 112th Congress, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG 
(Jan. 4, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/01/04/goodbye-and-good 
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b. Administrative Agencies 
 
 Although administrative agencies ostensibly operate with greater 
efficiency and flexibility than legislatures,123 they also face potential obstacles 
to enacting or adjusting regulations in response to rapid technological change. 
These obstacles can be divided into three categories. First, the authority 
delegated to an agency by a legislature may be a poor fit for the task of regulating 
an emerging technology where a technology or problem was unanticipated by 
the legislature. An outdated organic statute could limit or delay an agency’s 
regulatory response to certain aspects of a new technology or prevent an agency 
from regulating the new technology altogether.124 In the field of biotechnology, 
for example, commentators have observed that it is unclear whether any agency 
has authority to regulate genetically modified animals containing genes from 
other species and not intended for human consumption.125 As outlined in the 
previous section, amendment of an agency’s statutory authority can be a slow 
process, especially in a politically polarized climate.126  
Second, if an agency does have the authority to regulate a new 
technology, powerful stakeholders may nevertheless capture the agency and 
attempt to prevent effective regulation.127 The problem of regulatory capture is 
																																								 																				
-riddance-112th-congress/ [https://perma.cc/WE25-6SQE] (noting that the 112th Congress 
passed the fewest laws of “any Congress on record”); Statistics and Historical Comparison, 
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics [https://perma.cc/2XR4-98V5] (last 
visited Aug. 22, 2017) (listing the number of laws enacted by each session of Congress and 
showing that the past three have enacted the fewest laws since tracking began in 1948). This trend 
may change, however, after the most recent election, when Republicans took control of the pres-
idency and both houses of Congress. This anomaly itself represents a potential policy window. 
123 Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2012) (allowing, on its face, for agencies to promulgate binding 
rules after three easy steps: (1) notice, (2) comment, and (3) publication of “a concise general 
statement of [a rule’s] basis and purpose”). 
124 See Mandel, supra note 6, at 84 (“Statutes and regulations, almost by definition, are 
designed to handle regulatory concerns existing at the time of promulgation. It is not 
surprising that emerging technologies often exacerbate regulatory gaps or introduce new 
concerns that create new regulatory lacunae.”); Lyria Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal 
Responses to Technological Change: The Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J.L. 
SCI. & TECH. 505, 577 (providing examples). 
125 Mandel, supra note 6, at 84–85; see also Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, 
Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis in the Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants and 
Animals, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2167, 2230-36 (2004) (discussing the gaps in federal 
agencies’ authority to regulate genetically modified products). 
126 See supra pp. 21–23. 
127 See generally George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & 
MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971); see also Lawrence G. Baxter, “Capture” in Financial Regulation: Can 
We Channel it Toward the Common Good?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 175, 176-88 
(2011) (unpacking the different forms of capture). 
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well documented.128 In the context of emerging technologies, an incumbent 
industry benefiting from an existing regulatory scheme or hoping to handicap a 
new technology may use its clout to prevent an agency from effectively 
regulating the new technology, or at least from doing so in a manner that 
necessarily prioritizes the public interest.129 Similarly, powerful business 
interests invested in developing new technologies, such as Google or Uber in the 
case of autonomous vehicles, may attempt to prevent new regulations designed 
to promote safety, but which impose significant costs or disadvantage specific 
forms of a technology. 
Finally, even if an agency has the ability and will to regulate a new 
technology, the actual process of enacting or amending contested rules is often 
slow. A typical federal rule takes one to two years from the time an agency issues 
a notice of proposed rulemaking to the time it is published in the Federal 
Register.130 Some agencies take longer.131 This is largely the result of 
statutory,132 judicial,133 and executive branch-imposed134 procedural require-
																																								 																				
128 See, e.g., John Abraham & Rachel Ballinger, Science, Politics, and Health in the Brave New 
World of Pharmaceutical Carcinogenic Risk Assessment: Technical Progress or Cycle of 
Regulatory Capture? 75 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1433, 1434 (examining capture in public health 
regulation); Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air 
Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 105–109 (2011) (documenting capture in the 
context of environmental regulations); Daniel C. Hardy, Regulatory Capture in Banking 4-6 (Int’l 
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 34, 2006) (discussing capture within banking regulation). 
129 See Whitt, supra note 5, at 553 (describing this problem in the context of efforts by the 
Federal Communications Commission to regulate emerging communications technologies). 
130 Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical 
Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950-1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1414, 1456-58 (2012). 
131 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 1015 (1995) (finding 
the EPA usually takes over three years to comply with all procedural requirements). 
132 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (containing the procedural requirements applicable to the informal 
rulemaking process); see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (containing the procedural requirements 
applicable to the less frequently used formal rulemaking process). 
133 See, e.g., Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1311 (D.C. Cir.1991) (requiring that final 
rules be a logical outgrowth of proposed rules); U.S. v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp. 
568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977) (requiring that agencies disclose the “basic data relied 
upon” and answer, as part of its concise general statement, all “vital questions” raised in 
public comments). Since Vermont Yankee held that courts are “generally not free to impose 
. . . additional procedural requirements” beyond those provided for in Section 553, the paper 
hearing requirement and logical outgrowth test are both, ostensibly, interpretations of 
requirements contained in Section 553. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978). 
134 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 190 (Sept. 30, 1993) (requiring, among 
other things, that “significant regulatory actions” undergo a cost-benefit review by the Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs). 
 Journal of Law & Public Affairs  [Nov. 2018 
 
	
108 
ments. In addition, some argue that regulatory processes at the federal and state 
level have slowed, or “ossified,” significantly over the past forty years.135 In the 
U.S., regulatory agencies are required to undertake a number of analytical 
requirements to support regulatory decisions. These requirements are imposed 
by the legislative,136 judicial,137 and executive branches.138 Although a growing 
body of empirical research challenges the ossification thesis,139 “[a]dministrative 
law scholars appear almost universally to accept that pre-enforcement review of 
regulations at NHTSA,” the federal agency responsible for regulating 
autonomous vehicles, “has led to a decline in new regulations.”140  
 
c. Courts 
 
 The adaptive and reactive capacity of U.S. courts is also limited.141  
Three features help to account for this limited capacity. First, federal and state 
																																								 																				
135 See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385 (1992) (arguing that “[a]n assortment of analytical requirements . . . 
imposed on the simple rulemaking model, and evolving judicial doctrines . . . [requiring] agencies 
to take greater pains to ensure that the technical bases for rules are capable of withstanding judicial 
scrutiny” have caused the rulemaking process to “become increasingly rigid and burdensome”); 
see also JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO 
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 161 (1997) (“The past decade’s case study literature on the performance 
of America's administrative agencies details an agency-by-agency retreat from rulemaking.”). 
136 See supra note 132 (describing the procedural requirements applicable to formal and informal 
rulemaking). 
137 See supra note 133 (describing the paper hearing requirement and logical outgrowth test). 
138 See supra note 134 (describing the cost-benefit review required of significant regulatory 
actions). 
139 See, e.g., Yackee & Yackee, supra note 130, at 1445–63 (finding that “evidence that 
ossification generally is either a serious or widespread problem is mixed at best, and appears 
relatively weak overall”); Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1111, 1125–31 (concluding that “regulatory agencies have not 
abandoned their use of rulemaking”).  
140 Coglianese, supra note 139, at 1126–27 (citing JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, 
THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990)); see also  MASHAW, supra note 135; Robert 
Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: Twenty Years of Law and 
Politics, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 249 n.2 (1991); McGarity, supra note 135, at 
1412 (noting how judicial review has hampered NHTSA’s willingness to promulgate new 
rules);  Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the 
District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE 
L.J. 300, 311 (1988) (explaining that “NHTSA has abandoned almost completely its efforts 
to establish policy through rulemaking”). But see Coglianese, supra note 139, at 1127–29 
(questioning the empirical validity of such claims). 
141 This is not to say that courts and judges are incapable of adapting to technological change. 
Cf. Paul Martin & Patrick Schmidt, Courts During Periods of Rapid Technological Change: 
Comparative Perspectives on Freedom of Speech in the Digital Era 29 (Aug. 28, 2003) 
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courts are part of the common law tradition. In contrast to a civil law system, 
which relies on a comprehensive set of codified rules to guide the reasoning 
of judges, the common law system builds on prior judicial decisions in 
analogous cases to supply legal rules.142 Despite creating predictability and 
stability, the reliance on precedent and analogical reasoning places a check 
on rapid change in the legal system.143 As one commentator notes, the 
common law system is “grounded in the notion of slow, evolutionary 
adaptation . . . in a case-by-case format.”144 Although there is room for judges 
to adjust the law to new conditions by distinguishing or overruling 
precedent,145 the process of revising existing legal doctrines or developing 
new doctrines is slow and piecemeal.146 If one court–whether at the federal 
or state level–decides to adjust the law in response to a new technology, there 
is no guarantee that courts in other states or regions will do the same, and the 
rate at which other courts react could vary throughout the country. 
																																								 																				
(unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association) (on file with author) (finding that courts, despite reoccurring challenges, may 
find ways adapt to technological change, if only as a matter of necessity). The issue here, 
however, is that the speed at which they do so can have potentially deleterious effects on the 
development of a new technology. 
142 See generally Joseph Dainow, The Civil Law and Common Law: Some Points of 
Comparison, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 419 (1967) (providing a comparative overview of the 
common law and civil law systems). This is not to say that common law courts do not also 
rely on statutes – they do. Id. at 425–27. But common law courts deal primarily with 
precedent. Id. at 427. 
143 See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal 
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 625–26 (2001) (“The system of 
stare decisis . . . creates an explicitly path-dependent process in which later decisions rely 
on, and are constrained by, earlier decisions.”). 
144 Martin & Schmidt, supra note 141, at 14. But see Monroe E. Price & John F. Duffy, 
Technological Change and Doctrinal Persistence: Telecommunications Reform in Congress 
and the Court, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 976, 1009 (1997) (“Counterintuitively, technological 
change may . . . be more likely to lead to extensive . . . changes in the courts . . . .”). 
145 See Dainow, supra note 142, at 425 (“[A] judge [can] ‘distinguish’ [a] previous decision 
and leave its application limited to the specific fact situation which it control[s] . . . . The 
latter two techniques, distinguishing and overruling, ma[k]e room for flexibility and permit[] 
adjustment to new conditions.”); see also Hathaway, supra note 143, at 647 (“The law 
evolves gradually over time, drawing on an existing stock of precedent, punctuated by 
periods of rapid adaptation.”). 
146 See Lyria Bennett Moses, Adapting the Law to Technological Change: A Comparison of 
Common Law and Legislation, 26 U. NEW S. WHALES L.J. 394, 395 (2003) (noting that, 
although the common law “constantly adapts to technological change,” it is “slow, piecemeal 
and unable to reach an optimal solution to every problem on its own”). Moreover, fears about 
legitimacy may prevent judges from moving too far afield of prior decisions. See Martin & 
Schmidt, supra note 141, at 14. 
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Second, when courts apply and interpret statutes, they are virtually 
powerless to modify or discard outdated statutory rules.147 Where a statute is 
poorly suited to a new technology or otherwise obsolete, only the legislature can 
revise or repeal the rule. Although the various tools of statutory interpretation 
allow judges some flexibility in applying existing law, courts are, at least as a 
formal matter, powerless to adapt a statute to new technologies.148 These 
limitations, combined with the slow pace of legislative change, has prompted 
one prominent commentator, Guido Calabresi, to suggest that courts should 
“treat statutory rules in the same way as they do common law rules, effectively 
repealing them when they fail to achieve their purposes or no longer fit in the 
legal landscape in light of changing conditions.”149  
Finally, even when courts do attempt to adapt the law to technological 
change, the civil litigation process can be slow and protracted.150 It can take years 
for a single case to progress from the filing of a complaint at the trial level to a 
final appellate decision.151 In recent years, civil cases filed in federal district 
court have taken an average of thirty months, or two and a half years, to receive 
final appellate action.152 This figure is only an average, and cases involving 
multiple interested parties and complex new technologies may take even longer 
to litigate given the importance of an outcome to the commercial success of a 
																																								 																				
147 See infra Part II.B for a discussion of the ways in which a statute might be outdated; cf. 
also Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep Up with 
Technological Change, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 239, 247–69 (offering a typology 
of the different ways in which statutory rules can become outdated).  
148 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (vesting “[a]ll legislative Powers” in Congress); see also Robert 
Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. 
L. REV. 213, 217 (1983) (noting that “our jurisprudence treats the legislative command as a 
uniquely imperative form of legal authority from which judges, at least presumptively, can 
do no more than mechanically deduce right answers for specific cases”); Moses, supra note 
146, 412 (arguing that statutory obsolesce is “unlikely to be solved by judicial interpretation” 
and that only a legislature “can act to change [an outdated] rule”). 
149 Moses, supra note 147, at 281 (paraphrasing the thesis put forth in GUIDO CALABRESI, A 
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982)). 
150 See generally Michael Heise, Justice Delayed: An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case 
Disposition Time, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813, 834‒35 (2000) (conducting an empirical 
analysis of the disposition time for civil cases that reach a jury trial in state court); Theodore 
Eisenberg et al., Litigation Outcomes in State and Federal Courts: A Statistical Portrait, 19 
SEATTLE U. L. REV., 433, 434‒45 (1996) (comparing federal and state civil trials). 
151 See Heise, supra note 150, at 834‒35 (finding that the mean civil case disposition time in 
state court from filing to jury verdict is more than 30 months); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS tbl.B-4A (2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b4a_09 
30.2017.pdf (finding that the median civil case disposition time in federal court from filing 
to final order on appeal is more than 30 months). 
152 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 151, tbl.B4-A. 
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new technology and the non-specialized nature of most state and federal courts. 
The slow pace at which individual cases often advance through the court system 
only serves to exacerbate the systemic and jurisdictional checks discussed above. 
Indeed, when the developmental path of a technology is highly uncertain, as is 
the case with autonomous vehicles, “a judicial opinion could be outdated before 
it is even decided even at the time it is issued.”153 
 
2. Potential Regulatory Responses to Uncertainty and  
the Pacing Problem 
 
The slow rate at which traditional regulatory institutions often 
respond and adapt to technological change, as well as the perceived risks and 
uncertainties of emerging technologies, gives rise to three common 
regulatory responses. These responses—precaution, inaction, and 
proactivity—reflect fundamentally different understandings of regulation’s 
role in the emergence of novel technologies like autonomous vehicles. All 
three responses, however, are implicitly informed by an underlying 
uncertainty with respect to the ability of traditional legal institutions to 
effectively react and adapt to rapid changes in technology. Although the 
regulation of autonomous vehicles remains in a nascent stage, features of all 
three responses are discernable in the current regulation at the state and 
federal level, and are likely to inform future regulation. 
 
a. Attempt to Slow Technological Development 
 
The most conservative regulatory response to rapid technological 
change is to slow the development of a new technology. This approach, often 
referred to as the “precautionary principle,” is commonly reduced to the 
phrase “better safe than sorry.”154 The precautionary principle operates on the 
																																								 																				
153 Marchant, supra note 15, at 24. 
154 Stephen G. Wood et al., Whither the Precautionary Principle? An American Assessment from 
an Administrative Law Perspective, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 581, 581 (2006). There is no single 
manifestation of the precautionary principle and not every manifestation requires completely 
halting the development of a technology. See generally Per Sandin, Dimensions of the 
Precautionary Principle, 5 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 889 (1999) (arguing that 
there are several different formulations of the precautionary principle). The basic premise of the 
principle, however, remains consistent across these different manifestations. Moreover, although 
the precautionary principle first emerged in the context of environmental regulation, it has since 
been applied in a number of other contexts. See Chang-fa Lo, Risks, Scientific Uncertainty and 
the Approach of Applying Precautionary Principle, 28 J. MED. & L. 283, 289 (2009) (noting that 
the precautionary principle has also been applied to “genetically modified organisms (‘GMOS’), 
human rights, planetary defense, terrorist attacks, and tourism”). 
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assumption that it is best to limit or halt the commercial adoption of an 
emerging technology until it is explicitly shown to be safe or sufficient 
information exists to calibrate a proportionate regulatory response.155 As one 
commentator notes, this approach “seeks to create a ‘speed bump’ that can 
slow the pace of rapidly developing technologies whose risks are uncertain 
and regulatory frameworks incomplete.”156 In particular, by restraining the 
rate at which a new technology can take root and evolve, proponents believe 
that the precautionary principle provides regulators with additional time and 
information to design and enact regulatory frameworks, as well as reduces 
the likelihood that such frameworks will need to be amended based on new 
information regarding the risks or trajectory of an emerging technology.157  
 Although rarely framed as a direct response to the pacing problem, 
application of the precautionary principle is a common regulatory reaction to the 
scientific and developmental uncertainty which accompanies many new 
technologies.158 In U.S. domestic law, the precautionary principle is reflected in 
both environmental and health regulations.159 The U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, for example, requires pharmaceutical companies to demonstrate 
the efficacy and safety of new drugs and medical devices before they can enter 
																																								 																				
155 Sarah E. Light, Precautionary Federalism and the Sharing Economy, 66 EMORY L.J. 333, 337 
(2017) (“At its heart, the precautionary principle tells us that it is better to be safe than sorry in the 
face of significant risk of irreversible harm, even if we are uncertain about the magnitude of the risk.”). 
156 Gary E. Marchant, Addressing the Pacing Problem, in THE GROWING GAP BETWEEN EMERGING 
TECHNOLOGIES AND LEGAL-ETHICAL OVERSIGHT 200 (Gary E. Marchant et al. eds., 2011). 
157 See Light, supra note 155, at 363 (arguing that the precautionary principle serves an 
information forcing function); cf. also Han Somsen, Cloning Trojan Horses: Precautionary 
Regulation of Reproductive Technology, in REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES: LEGAL FUTURES, 
REGULATORY FRAMES AND TECHNOLOGICAL FIXES 228–29 (Roger Brownsword & Karen 
Yeung eds., 2008) (observing that the precautionary principle is “not so much a principle 
that urges regulators to stray on the side of caution . . . , as a procedural principle that instructs 
[regulators] to take account of all relevant knowledge in circumstances of scientific 
uncertainty and ignorance”). 
158 See James Cameron, The Precautionary Principle, in TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE 
MILLENNIUM 250 (Gary P. Sampson & W. Bradnee Chambers eds., 1999) (“[N]o country 
has so fully adopted the essence of the precautionary principle in domestic law as the United 
States.”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 15 
(2005) (observing that the precautionary principle “enjoys widespread international support” 
and “has been a staple of regulatory policy for several decades”); Wood et al., supra note 
154, at 585 (“[T]he regulatory policies embodied in the precautionary principle . . . have 
played, play and will continue to play a significant role in American law.”). 
159 See generally DIAHANNA LYNCH & DAVID VOGEL, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE 
REGULATION OF GMOS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES: A CASE-STUDY OF CONTEMP-
ORARY EUROPEAN REGULATORY POLITICS (2001), http://www.cfr.org/agricultural-policy/regulat 
ion-gmos-europe-united-states-case-study-contemporary-european-regulatory-politics/p8688 
(discussing the precautionary principle in U.S. law).  
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the market.160 Similarly, the Clean Air Act requires the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to apply “an adequate margin of safety” in setting 
emission limits for hazardous pollutants.161 European law also draws heavily on 
the precautionary principle to address legal and scientific uncertainty.162 In 
response to the emergence of genetically modified foods, for instance, the 
European Commission has permitted only certain varieties to enter Europe and 
requires labeling for those which are on the market.163  
In the context of autonomous vehicles, some states have already 
responded to the emergence of driverless technology by attempting to slow its 
development. As discussed in Part I, several states require that a human driver 
be present in an autonomous vehicle during operation and effectively require that 
all autonomous vehicles feature a steering wheel, brake pedal, and accelerator.164 
Similarly, other states only allow the operation of autonomous vehicles for 
testing purposes and prohibit or limit commercial applications.165 Although no 
longer federal policy, NHTSA previously urged states to both prohibit the 
“operation of autonomous vehicles for purposes other than testing” and require 
that a human driver be present and capable of taking control over an autonomous 
vehicle.166 These laws, in essentially slowing the development of autonomous 
vehicles by mandating technically unnecessary features or simply limiting their 
operation, attempt  to render autonomous vehicle technology a stationary target 
more amenable to the limited reactive and adaptive capabilities of regulatory 
institutions. That is, rather than accelerating the rate at which the institutions 
overseeing autonomous vehicles operate, laws in some states are slowing or 
manipulating the rate at which autonomous vehicle technology can be adopted 
so that regulatory institutions have an opportunity to keep pace. 
																																								 																				
160 See 21 U.S.C. § 360e (requiring pre-market approval of new medical devices based on a 
showing that the device is “safe and effective”); 21 C.F.R. § 314 (same for new drugs).  
161 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). 
162 See LYNCH & VOGEL, supra note 159, at 22 (observing that the precautionary principle 
“has become increasingly influential in Europe”). 
163 See Emily Marden, Risk and Regulation: U.S. Regulatory Policy on Genetically Modified 
Food and Agriculture, 44 B.C. L. REV. 733, 735 (2003) (“[T]he European Commission has 
taken a precautionary approach toward [genetically modified foods], and has permitted only 
limited varieties of GM species to be introduced in Europe.”).  
164 See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text (listing these states). In its 2016 policy 
statement, NHTSA also proposed a “pre-market approval” system, wherein the agency would 
have prohibited “the manufacture, introduction into commerce, offer for sale and sale” of 
autonomous vehicles without agency approval based on “the safety of [a] vehicle’s performance.” 
NHTSA POLICY 2016, supra note 8, at 72. The agency subsequently abandoned that proposal in 
its 2017 policy statement.   
165 See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text (listing and describing the laws in these states).  
166 NHTSA POLICY 2013, supra note 13, at 10.  
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b. Avoid Amending Existing Regulations or Enacting  
New Regulations 
 
A second response to rapid technological change is to limit or refrain 
from regulating a new technology.167 This approach, labeled “permissionless 
innovation” by one commentator,168 views regulation as a potential 
impediment to the development of emerging technologies.169 It maintains that 
because regulatory institutions struggle to reverse or even revise prior 
actions, regulators should refrain from acting until market failures demand 
intervention or conclusive proof exists that a technology causes harm.170 In 
contrast to the precautionary principle, permissionless innovation places its 
faith in market forces and existing legal frameworks to maximize the success 
and safety of new technologies.171 Although new regulations or adjustments 
may sometimes be warranted,172 proponents of the approach assume that 
attempting to regulate through lethargic or otherwise flawed legal institutions 
																																								 																				
167 Cf. Michael Kirby, New Frontier: Regulating Technology by Law and ‘Code’, in 
REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES: LEGAL FUTURES, REGULATORY FRAMES AND TECH-
NOLOGICAL FIXES 375 (Roger Brownsword & Karen Yeung eds., 2008) (“[A] failure to 
provide law to deal with . . . [new] technologies is not socially neutral. Effectively, to do 
nothing is often to make a decision.”). 
168 ADAM THIERER, PERMISSIONLESS INNOVATION: THE CONTINUING CASE FOR COMP-
REHENSIVE TECHNOLOGICAL FREEDOM 1 (2016), http://permissionlessinnovation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/Thierer_Permissionless_web.pdf. 
169 See generally id. at 8–12 (summarizing this approach); see also Adam Thierer, 
Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precaution-
ary Principle, 14 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 309, 352–56 (2013) (describing further the 
premises on which this approach rests). 
170 See KENNETH A. OYE ET AL., ON BELIEFS AND REGIMES: JUSTIFICATION, CAUSAL 
KNOWLEDGE, AND MEASURES OF COMPLIANCE 15 (2005) (discussing the range of work 
which challenges the precautionary principle and describing this work’s general presumption 
that “[r]egulators should not act until after there is conclusive proof of harms, because 
regulatory actions are often irreversible”). 
171 See, e.g., Marc Scribner, Self-Driving Regulation: Pro-Market Policies Key to Automated 
Vehicle Innovation 1 (Competitive Enter. Inst. Working Paper No. 192, 2014), https://cei.org 
/sites/default/files/Marc%20Scribner%20-%20Self-Driving%20Regulation.pdf (“[R]egulatory 
and legislative intervention . . . poses great risks to the development of [new] technolog[ies]. . . . 
[L]aws and regulations that narrow the scope of permissible development, testing, and operational 
functionality risk locking in inferior technology, delaying adoption, and increasing prices faced 
by consumers.”). 
172 See, e.g., Adam Thierer & Ryan Hagemann, Removing Roadblocks to Intelligent Vehicles 
and Driverless Cars 13 (Mercatus Ctr. Working Paper, 2014), https://www.mercatus.org/ 
system/files/Thierer-Intelligent-Vehicles.pdf (“To the extent that more serious problems 
develop or persist, public policy can always be adjusted to address those issues after careful 
evaluation of the costs and benefits of proposed rules.”). 
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will impose greater costs than benefits.173 As one commentator argues, 
“[u]nless a compelling case can be made that an invention poses a serious 
immediate threat to public well-being, innovation should be allowed to 
continue unabated.”174  
This combination of inaction and legalization is frequently proposed 
as a response to rapid technological change.175 A good example is early 
efforts to regulate the Internet.176 In his 1997 Framework for Global 
Electronic Commerce, for instance, President Clinton articulated a largely 
hands-off approach to regulating Internet technologies.177 His skepticism of 
regulatory intervention was based in large part on concerns about the 
incongruous rates at which the Internet and regulatory systems could 
develop.178As the President warned, since “[b]usiness models must evolve 
rapidly to keep pace with the break-neck speed of [technological change], 
government attempts to regulate are likely to be outmoded by the time they 
are finally enacted, especially to the extent such regulations are technology-
specific.”179 Thus, instead of attempting to slow or otherwise manage the 
development of information technology, President Clinton recommended 
																																								 																				
173 See, e.g., Daniel Sarewitz, Anticipatory Governance of Emerging Technologies, in THE 
GROWING GAP BETWEEN EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND LEGAL-ETHICAL OVERSIGHT 98 (Gary 
E. Marchant et al. eds., 2011) (“[T]he alignment of technological innovation with the ideologies 
of the marketplace . . . tell us that the appropriate measures of technological value are monetary[ 
] and [that] the appropriate mode of intervention is hands-off.”); cf. JOEL MOKYR, LEVER OF 
RICHES: TECHNOLOGICAL CREATIVITY AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS 16 (1990) (“Technological 
progress is like a fragile and vulnerable plant, whose flourishing is not only dependent on the 
appropriate surroundings and climate, but whose life is almost always short. It is highly sensitive 
. . . and can easily be arrested by relatively small external changes.”). 
174 Thierer & Hagemann, supra note 172, at 10. 
175 See Demissie, Taming Matter for the Welfare of Humanity: Regulating Nanotechnology, 
in REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES: LEGAL FUTURES, REGULATORY FRAMES AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL FIXES 340 (Roger Brownsword & Karen Yeung eds., 2008) (noting the 
popularity of this approach and describing it as “regulatory vogue”); Gregory N. Mandel, 
History Lessons for a General Theory of Law and Technology, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
551, 564 (2007) (“[T]here often appears to be an inclination to handle new technology 
disputes under existing rules.”); Lin, supra note 6, at 380 (observing that many “new 
technologies . . . develop and come to market with little or no government oversight”). 
176 See THIERER, supra note 168, at 14–15 (arguing that the Clinton administration’s “market-
oriented vision for cyberspace governance” is a prototypical example of permissionless 
innovation). 
177 See William J. Clinton & Albert Gore Jr., A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce 
(July 1, 1997), https://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/Commerce/read.html (describing a “non-
regulatory, market-oriented approach”) 
178 See id. (cautioning that the Internet’s “explosive” growth could pose “significant logistical 
and technological challenges” to regulators). 
179 Id. 
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that states and federal agencies “refrain from imposing new and unnecessary 
regulations . . . on commercial activities that take place via the Internet.”180 
Inaction and simple legalization have also been the most common 
regulatory responses to autonomous vehicle technology. As described in Part I, 
most states have refrained from prohibiting or strictly controlling the 
development and operation of autonomous vehicles.181 Since the operation of 
autonomous vehicles is generally presumed to be legal in every state without an 
explicit prohibition, most states have effectively—if not formally—legalized 
their operation.182  The federal government, moreover, acting through NHTSA, 
has carefully limited its regulatory activities.183 Although the agency has 
published non-binding best practices for industry participants184 and is currently 
considering ways to remove barriers to autonomous vehicle technologies in 
existing FMVSS,185 it has mostly remained a passive observer.186 This paucity 
of state and federal action is no accident and, in some cases, is framed as a direct 
response to the pacing problem.187 As autonomous vehicle developers, scholars, 
																																								 																				
180 Id. 
181 See supra Part I.B.2 (surveying state laws). 
182 See Smith, supra note 7 (explaining this presumption); see also Thad Moore, As Self-
Driving Cars Come to More States, Regulators Take a Back Seat, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ economy/as-self-driving-cars-come-to-
more-states-regulators-take-a-back-seat/2015/08/28/7a29413e-474f-11e5-8ab4-c73967a14 
3d3_story.html [https://perma.cc/L8MB-FJ5K] (reporting that, based on the strength of this 
presumption, manufacturers have been taking prototypes on cross-country trips through 
states without autonomous vehicle laws). 
183 See supra Part I.B.1 (describing the federal response to autonomous vehicles); see also 
Kohler & Colbert-Taylor, supra note 58, at 105 (“[T]he U.S. federal government has not 
attempted to regulate autonomous motor vehicles as such . . . .”); RAND REPORT, supra note 
8, at 103 (“There are currently no federal regulations related specifically to [autonomous 
vehicle] technologies.”). 
184 NHTSA POLICY 2017, supra note 55, at 1-18; NHTSA POLICY 2016, supra note 8, at 11–
36. 
185 See Removing Regulatory Barriers for Vehicles with Automated Driving Systems, 83 
Fed. Reg. 2607 (Jan. 18, 2018) (seeking public comment on “regulatory barriers in the 
existing [FMVSS]”). 
186 Although the two bills currently pending in Congress, H.R. 3388 and S. 1885, encourage 
NHTSA to consider creating some technology-specific regulations, they would mostly 
codify the agency’s existing hands-off approach and leave in place the legal framework 
governing conventional vehicles. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the main components of 
both bills). 
187 See, e.g., NHTSA POLICY 2017, supra note 55, at ii, 1 (“The Federal Government wants 
to ensure it does not impede progress with unnecessary or unintended barriers to innovation. 
. . . As automated driving technologies evolve at a rapid pace, . . . [e]ach entity is free to be 
creative and innovative when developing the best method for its system to appropriately 
mitigate the safety risks associated with their approach.”); NHTSA POLICY 2013, supra note 
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and lawmakers continue to raise concerns about whether existing regulatory 
machinery can keep pace with autonomous vehicle technology, inaction and 
simple legalization are likely to remain popular responses. 
 
c. Attempt to Regulate into the Future 
 
A third response to rapid technological change is to enact future-facing 
regulations that attempt to anticipate or otherwise shape the development of 
an emerging technology. Proponents of this response acknowledge the 
limitations of regulatory institutions but view regulation as an important 
element in the success and safety of new innovations.188 They maintain that, 
because regulatory institutions struggle to react and adapt to rapid changes in 
emerging technologies, regulators must design frameworks which anticipate, 
or attempt to guide, their ongoing and future development.189 In particular, the 
approach assumes that regulators must minimize the probability that 
regulations enacted in response to a new technology will need to be revised or 
revisited in the future.190 Although there is no uniform theory of how to avoid 
such revisions, the two most prominent approaches are to (1) mandate specific 
characteristics or forms of a technology191 and (2) draft technology-neutral 
																																								 																				
13, at 10 (“Because . . . the technical specifications for . . . automated systems are still in 
flux, the agency believes that regulation of the technical performance of automated vehicles 
is premature at this time.”); see also Moore, supra note 182 (discussing the lack of 
autonomous vehicle legislation and its relationship to many state lawmakers’ concerns about 
stifling autonomous vehicle technology as it continues to evolve). 
188 See, e.g., Karni Chagal-Feferkorn, The Reasonable Algorithm, 2018 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & 
POL’Y 111, 129‒30 (2018) (proposing a technology-neutral standard for regulating 
algorithms so as to avoid “the need to constantly update laws and regulations” and arguing 
that appropriate regulation “could have a positive effect on innovation[,] . . . create proper 
incentives for the efficient use of humans and algorithms, and . . . allow victims of harm 
caused by algorithms to stand on equal ground in terms of recovery”). 
189 See Brad A. Greenberg, Rethinking Technology Neutrality, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1495, 1521 
(2016) (“To avoid being made obsolete by technological changes, a law needs to anticipate 
innovations; it can do so through prescience or . . . provisions that enable flexible application.”); 
Michael Birnhack, Reverse Engineering Information Privacy Law, 15 YALE J. L. & TECH. 24, 
38–39 (2013) (“Given that the law cannot anticipate new technologies in detail, and once we 
acknowledge that technology does develop and change faster than the pace of the legislative 
process, the preference for a law that will last for longer than the present moment is clear.”). 
190 See Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet 
Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 1359 (2001) (describing the need to establish 
“effective and enduring” regulations); see also S. Rep. No. 102-294, at 36 (1992) (designing 
copyright rules to spare “Congress from having to revisit this issue almost annually in order 
to keep pace with the rapidly changing technological world”). 
191 See Greenberg, supra note 189, at 1523 (identifying this as one of the two forms of future-
facing regulations); Justin R. Pidot, Governance and Uncertainty, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 113, 131 
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laws which focus on achieving a particular state of the world rather than a 
particular state of a technology.192 
A future-facing approach to the regulation of emerging technologies 
is perhaps the most natural and deliberate response to the pacing problem. As 
such, regulators have operationalized this principle in a wide range of 
technological contexts over the past forty years.193 In an attempt to “future-
proof” copyright law, for example, Congress enacted a technology-neutral 
regulatory framework in 1976.194 Whereas earlier frameworks conditioned 
the protection of original works on the form or medium in which they were 
fixed, the Copyright Act of 1976 extended protection to works “fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression.”195 In making this change, lawmakers sought 
to uncouple “the scope of an author’s rights” from specific technologies and 
eliminate the need for future revisions based on “unknown and unforeseen 
technologies.”196 Instead of “forc[ing] the law to struggle” with rapid changes 
or requiring regular updates to copyright law, lawmakers aimed to craft a 
framework “adaptable to technological advances.”197 
																																								 																				
(2015) (same); cf. Jaegul Lee et al., Innovation and Technology Policy: Lessons from Emission 
Control and Safety Technologies in the U.S. Automobile Industry 7-8 (April 2007) (working 
paper prepared for the Sloan Industry Studies Conference) (reviewing the use of technology 
forcing regulations mandating adoption of “specific technologies or technological pathways”). 
192 See Greenberg, supra note 189, at 1512–13 (“Rather than force the law to struggle with new 
technologies, and in the interest of sparing legislators the time-consuming effort of frequent 
revisions, technology neutrality attempts to avoid ossification by making a statute more adaptable 
to technological advances.”); Geist, supra note 190, at 1359 (“Technology neutral . . . refers to 
statutory tests or guidelines that do not depend upon a specific development or state of technology, 
but rather are based on core principles that can be adapted to changing technologies.”). 
193 See, e.g., Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now? Toward 
Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data that Congress Could Enact, 
27 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 117, 117 (2012) (proposing a technology-neutral “legislative model for 
law enforcement access standards and downstream privacy protections for location 
information”); Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General 
Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1015–17 (2010) (positing that courts have applied the Fourth 
Amendment in a technology-neutral manner); Geist, supra note 190, at 1345–46 (recommending 
a technology-neutral jurisdictional test for cases involving predominantly Internet-based 
contacts); Nicholas W. Allard & Theresa Lauerhass, Debalkanize the Telecommunications 
Marketplace, 28 CAL. W. L. REV. 231, 231 (1992) (examining the need for a technology-neutral 
implementation of telecommunications policies). 
194 Greenberg, supra note 189, at 1517; Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–533, 90 Stat. 
2541 (codified at scattered sections of title 17 of the United States Code). 
195 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
196 Greenberg, supra note 189, at 1517 n.93 (quoting STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 6: SUPPLEMENTARY REP. OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 18 (Comm. Print 1965)). 
197 Id. at 1513. 
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Despite its intuitive appeal, states have largely avoided future-facing 
regulations in the autonomous vehicle context. The vast majority of states 
make no attempt to shape or anticipate the development of autonomous 
vehicle technology, limiting themselves to logistical management of product 
testing or affirmative declarations that autonomous vehicles are legal under 
existing law.198 The federal government, by contrast, has relied at least in part 
on NHTSA’s technology-neutral recall authority as it seeks to avoid more 
prescriptive actions.199 As discussed in Part I, that recall authority, as applied 
to vehicle and equipment defects, allows the agency to order a recall if it finds 
an “unreasonable risk to safety.”200 The “unreasonable risk” standard is part 
of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, a law originally 
enacted in 1966,  but it remains central to the work of federal regulators.201 
Although NHTSA’s policy has been to refrain from mandating the use or 
design of specific autonomous vehicle technologies, and it has yet to order 
any recalls, the agency appears confident that it can ensure autonomous 
vehicle safety based predominantly on this technology-neutral authority and 
without taking prescriptive actions in the future.202 
 
B. Obstacles Created by Regulatory Responses to the Pacing Problem 
 
The preceding section outlined the inherent challenge of regulating 
rapidly evolving technologies like autonomous vehicles and described three 
categories of common regulatory responses to this challenge. Although the aim 
																																								 																				
198 See supra Part I.B.2 (noting the presumption that autonomous vehicles are legal and 
explaining that very few states address specific aspects of autonomous vehicle design). 
Although state laws requiring a steering wheel, brake pedal, and accelerator could be viewed 
as attempts to shape the development of autonomous vehicle technology, their motivation 
appears to be more in line with the precautionary principle. 
199 See supra Part I.B.1 (describing the current federal policy on autonomous vehicles).  
200 See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text (detailing NHTSA’s recall authority) 
201 See generally NAT’L HIGHWAY TRANSP. SAFETY ADMIN., UNDERSTANDING NHTSA’S 
REGULATORY TOOLS 2–4 (2016), https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/ 
understanding_nhtsas_current_regulatory_tools-tag.pdf (providing an overview of the regulatory 
tools, including determinations and remediations of unreasonable risks to safety, available to 
NHTSA under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act). 
202 NHTSA POLICY 2017, supra note 55, at 3 (“NHTSA has broad enforcement authority to 
address existing and new automotive technologies and equipment. . . . Specifically, 
NHTSA’s enforcement authority concerning safety-related defects in motor vehicles and 
motor vehicle equipment extends and applies equally to current and emerging ADSs.”); 
NHTSA Enforcement Bulletin, supra note 65, at 65, 708 (“NHTSA’s enforcement authority 
concerning safety-related defects in motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment extends 
and applies equally to current and emerging automated safety technologies. This includes 
fully automated (self-driving) vehicles.”). 
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of all three responses is to overcome the inertia of regulatory institutions and 
facilitate the safe and widespread adoption of beneficial new technologies, each 
has potential drawbacks. As lawmakers, scholars, and market participants 
consider how to realize the benefits of autonomous vehicles, it is not only 
important to identify the inherent limitations of existing regulatory processes, but 
also to appreciate any shortcomings in perceived solutions to these problems. In 
the following section, I outline these shortcomings, describing the legal and 
social barriers to the successful development of rapidly evolving technologies 
generated by each response to the pacing problem and the ways in which these 
barriers could negatively impact the development of autonomous vehicles.203 
 
1. Potential Drawbacks of Failing to Regulate 
	
The most basic response to the pacing problem is to do nothing—leave 
existing laws in place and refrain from enacting new laws. Although there is a 
seductive simplicity and certain advantages to taking a hands-off approach to 
regulating rapidly evolving technologies,204 the failure to amend existing laws 
or enact new laws can create both regulatory uncertainty for market 
participants and low public confidence in the safety of new technologies. 
 
a. Regulatory Uncertainty 
 
As new technologies give rise to novel “forms of conduct” and new 
“activities and relationships,” existing laws “may not operate as effectively as 
they did in the past.”205 The disconnect between existing law and innovation can 
generate significant regulatory uncertainty for market participants.206 This 
uncertainty can take at least three forms: (1) potential prohibitions on a new tech-
nology, (2) application of ambiguous legal terms and concepts to a new techno-
logy, and (3) superfluous rules governing the design or use of a new technology.207 
																																								 																				
203 The purpose of this section is not to establish that these regulatory responses have no utility or 
are never appropriate; rather, its purpose is to emphasize that perceived solutions to the pacing 
problem can themselves create obstacles to the commercial success of emerging technologies. 
204 Cf. Demissie, supra note 1, at 340 (describing inaction and deregulation as “regulatory 
vogue”). 
205 Lyria Bennett Moses, Agents of Change: How the Law ‘Copes’ with Technological 
Change, 20 GRIFFITH L. REV. 763, 767 (2011); see also Mandel, supra note 175, at 568 (“[I]t 
should be anticipated that preexisting legal regimes may run into problems when being used 
to govern technology that did not exist when the regimes were created.”). 
206 See generally Moses, supra note 147, at 253-57 (discussing the problem of legal 
uncertainty as it relates to new technologies). 
207 As should be obvious from the following subsection, these categories are not mutually 
exclusive and frequently overlap. The subsection, moreover, is not intended as an exhaustive 
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i. Prohibitions in Existing Laws 
 
First, existing laws may prohibit the production, sale, or specific uses 
of an emerging technology. In most cases, such prohibitions are inadvertent 
and result from technological developments which could have never been 
anticipated when lawmakers drafted the relevant statute or regulation.208 In 
particular, a new relationship, activity, or type of conduct made possible by 
an emerging technology may “fall within a rule despite being irrelevant to 
[its] goals.”209 Notwithstanding the inadvertent nature of these prohibitions, 
failing to amend existing laws or enact new laws can leave developers, 
retailers, and users of new technologies in a precarious position. Indeed, as 
long as outdated rules remain in force, market participants must depend on 
the enforcement discretion of federal and state agencies, creating an unstable 
and potentially inconsistent legal environment for all parties.210 
A classic example of existing law impeding the adoption of a new 
technology is the traditional common law rule that land is owned usque ad 
coelum, or infinitely upwards.211 In the pre-aviation era, this rule stood for the 
intuitive proposition that a land owner is entitled to the exclusive use of any air 
space above his property.212 However, as aviation technologies started to 
																																								 																				
analysis of every type of uncertainty; it aims, instead, to highlight several of the most 
disruptive types of uncertainty arising from inaction.  
208 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 25, ch. 600, 1991 Va. Acts 1111 (amending VA. CODE § 32.1-289.1 
(1991), which was intended to prohibit the sale of organs, so that women could sell ova for in 
vitro fertilization, the donation of which was technologically impossible when the law was 
originally passed); see also Moses, supra note 146, at 400-01 (discussing more generally 
inadvertent prohibitions in the context of over and under-inclusive laws); Moses, supra note 147, 
at 260-64 (discussing issues with statutory ambiguities resulting in under or over-inclusiveness of 
prohibitions applied to technological developments and providing relevant examples in ADA 
designations, railroad owner liabilities, and computer and internet related complications). 
209 See Moses, supra note 147, at 260 (“New artifacts, activities, and relationships may fall 
within a rule despite being irrelevant to their goals . . . .”). 
210 See Mandel, supra note 175, at 564–65 (describing such problems in the context of 
biotechnology and nanotechnology).  
211 See Moses, supra note 146, at 399 (offering this example); see also Lora D. Lashbrook, The 
“Ad Coelum” Maxim As Applied to Aviation Law, 21 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 143, 146–7, 154 
(1946) (applying the ad coelum doctrine to commercial air travel in the United States). 
212 See, e.g., Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327, 329–30 (1922) (finding that the 
plaintiff had an arguable claim to trespass for shooting a bullet across the land of another); 
Hannabalson v. Sessions, 90 N.W. 93, 94–95 (Iowa 1902) (affirming the vitality of usque ad 
coelum in a claim involving the thrusting of an arm across the property of another); 
Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Barnes, 30 Ky. L. Rptr. 1290, 1291–92 (Ky. App. 1907) 
(finding an unlawful trespass by defendant for extending boards from a telephone pole across 
the land of another); see also Lashbrook, supra note 211, at 143–46 (summarizing the 
doctrine’s historical development); Moses, supra note 146, at 399 (same). 
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emerge, the doctrine threatened to complicate efforts to commercialize air 
travel, as it would have effectively prohibited the operation of balloons and 
airplanes since every flight over private land risked being prosecuted as a 
trespass.213 Although courts eventually stepped in to circumscribe the doctrine 
and allow commercial aviation to move forward,214 early participants faced 
legal uncertainty as a result of the unanticipated intersection between property 
law and aviation technologies.215 Without judicial intervention—a possibility 
only in the common law context—new aviation technologies could have 
remained grounded.  
Although less pronounced, developers of autonomous vehicles also 
face uncertainty with respect to performance standards and the legality of 
general and specific applications of their products.216 At the international level, 
for example, the 1949 Geneva Convention on Road Traffic, to which the U.S. 
is a party, requires every vehicle to have a “driver” who is “at all times . . . able 
to control [it].”217 Although an intuitive requirement with respect to the safe 
																																								 																				
213 See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS 
MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COST LIVES 28 (2008) (observing if the doctrine was enforc-
ed literally “then crossing each [air] column without permission [would have been] a trespass”). 
214 See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260–61 (1946) (holding that the ad coelum doctrine 
“has no place in the modern world”); see also Johnson v. Curtiss N.W. Airplane Co., 1928 U.S. 
Av. Rep. 42 (Minn. D. Ct. 1923) (finding the common law principle inapplicable to aviation 
because “[m]odern progress and great public interests should not be blocked by unnecessary legal 
refinements”); Commonwealth v. Nevin, 1928 U. S. Av. Rep. 39, 41 (Pa. D. & C.2d 1922) 
(refusing to apply trespass law where the law did not clearly contemplate airplane travel); Roger 
F. Williams, The Existence of the Right to Flight, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 738–40 (1931) 
(discussing prior cases involving trespass across property by airplanes to support the proposition 
that there exists a right to flight across private property). 
215 Indeed, legal scholars vigorously debated the extent of property rights in air space and 
whether airplanes could operate without some exercise of a state’s power of eminent domain 
or police power. See generally Arthur L. Newman, Aviation Law and the Constitution, 39 
YALE L.J. 1113, 1127–29 (1930) (summarizing the conflict between property rights and 
aviation and the legal arguments made during litigation of trespass claims). 
216 See, e.g., ANITA KIM ET AL., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRANSPORTATION ADMIN., REVIEW OF 
FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS (FMVSS) FOR AUTOMATED VEHICLES 8-21 
(2016) (identifying FMVSS which “may pose challenges to the introduction of automated 
vehicles”); Letter from Chris Urmson, Director, Google Self-Driving Car Project, to Paul A. 
Hemmersbaugh, Chief Counsel, NHTSA (Nov. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Google Letter] (on 
file with the author) (requesting NHTSA interpretations on a number of FMVSS which could 
render all or part of Google’s autonomous vehicle design illegal); see also NHTSA POLICY 
2016, supra note 8, at 48-52 (suggesting that existing vehicle safety standards may prohibit 
some autonomous vehicle technologies, or at least create this perception among market 
participants, by noting the importance of agency interpretation letters and the need to issue 
such interpretations and exemptions on an expedited basis).  
217 Geneva Convention on Road Traffic art. 8, Sept. 19, 1949, 3 U.S.T. 3008, 125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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operation of traditional vehicles, such a mandate could prevent the lawful use 
of autonomous vehicles, at least to the extent that no human is able to intervene 
in the automated vehicle’s operation.218 Similarly, at the federal level, 
compliance with many FMVSS is contingent upon the presence of a human 
“driver” and controls like a steering wheel.219 Vehicle codes in several states 
also outlaw the operation of a vehicle without “one hand” remaining on the 
steering mechanism.220 These rules, clearly designed with traditional vehicles 
in mind, have the potential to impede the development of fully automated 
vehicles, which specifically aim to eliminate active human control over vehicle 
movements.221 Although regulators are unlikely to enforce such prohibitions, 
leaving these laws on the books creates additional risk and uncertainty for 
investors in autonomous vehicle technologies. 
 
ii. Ambiguous Terms and Concepts in Existing Laws 
 
Second, new technologies may also reveal “latent ambiguities” in the 
terms and concepts contained in existing laws.222 Such ambiguities often arise 
“where new technology or new forms of conduct do not fit easily into existing 
conceptual and legal categories.”223 A word or idea may have had a straight-
																																								 																				
218 But see Smith, supra note 7, at 433-41 (concluding that, at least under international law, 
“the term ‘driver’ is probably flexible”); Removing Regulatory Barriers for Vehicles with 
Automated Driving Systems, 83 Fed. Reg.  2607 (Jan. 18, 2018) (seeking public comment 
on ways to remove “regulatory barriers in the existing [FMVSS]”); infra pp. 45–46 
(discussing whether computers might qualify as drivers). 
219 See ANITA KIM ET AL., supra note 216, at 1–2, 10–11 (“If manufacturers want to sell 
vehicles only intended for automated operation, with no way for human occupants to drive 
the vehicle, they are likely to have difficulty certifying to requirements for a foot-actuated 
service brake control (517.135), a designated seating position for the driver (571.207), a 
steering wheel (a requirement for completing tests specified in 571.126), and certain controls 
and displays.”); see also Removing Regulatory Barriers for Vehicles with Automated 
Driving Systems, 83 Fed. Reg.  2607 (Jan. 18, 2018) (further describing “regulatory barriers 
in the existing [FMVSS]”). 
220 See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1226 (detailing the requirements for handling a 
steering mechanism); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 13 (specifying the requirements for 
operating a vehicle). 
221 State laws requiring minimum spacing between vehicles could also complicate efforts to 
use autonomous vehicles in tightly grouped platoons. See Smith, supra note 7, app. 1 at 518-
21 (listing and analyzing such laws).  
222 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 at 25-26, 155-56 (2006); see also Mandel, supra 
note 175, at 553 (“[W]here [a] new issue arises as a result of technological change, . . . old 
categories may no longer apply.”); Moses, supra note 147, at 257 (“Some legal categories 
and concepts become ambiguous in light of technological change.”). 
223 Moses, supra note 146, at 396. 
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forward meaning or application in its original context, but technological 
innovations, among other developments, may allow for multiple, often 
competing ways of interpreting or applying the same words and concepts.224 A 
good example is the shifting definition of what it means to be a person’s lawful 
“mother.”225 Traditionally, a mother was “the woman who bore a child and 
contributed to its genetic identity.”226 With the development of in vitro 
fertilization, however, the mother of a child could be at least two people: the 
woman who provides the ovum and the woman who serves as the surrogate.227 
Although innocuous on its face, this ambiguity has generated significant 
uncertainty in states with laws granting custody of child to its “mother,” as the 
term could reasonably apply to both the donor and the surrogate.228  
The same types of ambiguities are present in the laws governing 
traditional vehicles. A particularly important ambiguity involves the terms 
“driver” and “operator.” As described above, the Geneva Convention 
requires that a “driver” be able to control a vehicle at all times.229 Many 
federal and state regulations also impose specific obligations on the “driver” 
or “operator” of a vehicle.230 When natural persons were the only entities 
physically controlling vehicles, the meaning of these terms was generally 
clear.231 As applied to autonomous vehicles, however, the terms are 
ambiguous.232 In particular, it is not always clear whether a “driver” or 
“operator” of a vehicle also encompasses the computer which controls an 
																																								 																				
224 See Lessig, supra note 222, at 25 (describing this problem). 
225 See generally Michael H. Shapiro, Lawyers, Judges and Bioethics, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. 
L.J. 113 (1997). 
226 Moses, supra note 147, at 257. 
227 Id. 
228 See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (addressing the question of whether 
the donor or surrogate was the “natural mother” of a child born through in vitro fertilization under 
California law). Of course, not every custody statute leaves the term “mother” undefined and 
many states have amended their laws to include a definition of the term. See Susan L. Crockin & 
Gary A. Debele, Ethical Issues in Assisted Reproduction: A Primer for Family Law Attorneys, 27 
ETHICAL ISSUES IN ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 289, 340-43 (2015) (surveying the law around 
sperm and egg donation). 
229 See Convention on Road Traffic, supra note 217. 
230 See ANITA KIM ET AL., supra note 216, at 3-4, 17-25 (identifying every use of “driver” and 
“operator” in the FMVSS); Smith, supra note 7, at 464 n.307 (listing state and federal regulations). 
231 But not always. See, e.g., Fairman v. Mors, 130 P.2d 448, 450-51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942) 
(holding that, under California law, “a[n] automobile incapable of moving under its own 
power is not ‘driven’ by any of its occupants when being towed by another automobile”). 
232  Cf. ANITA KIM ET AL., supra note 216, at 18 (“[L]anguage throughout the FMVSS is 
clear in a world where all vehicles require a human driver for manual control, but the 
meaning of the term ‘driver’ could become less certain or different when considered in the 
context of vehicles with increasingly automated capabilities.”). 
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autonomous vehicle.233 The uncertainty generated by this ambiguity is further 
compounded by the varying statutory and common law definitions of the terms, 
each of which could lead to slightly different results.234 In some states, for 
example, the driver of an autonomous vehicle could be the computer; in others 
it could be the owner; still in others it could be the person who summoned or 
started the vehicle.235 When making investment decisions, individuals and firms 
may struggle with this ambiguity, unsure of the liabilities they could incur or the 
ways in which an autonomous vehicle could be lawfully used. 
 
iii. Superfluous Requirements and Limitations in Existing Laws 
 
Finally, existing laws may impose unnecessary limitations or 
requirements on the design or use of a new technology. Like the prohibitions 
discussed above, these superfluous mandates are generally the result of 
unforeseeable technological developments.236 In particular, a new relationship, 
activity, or type of conduct made possible by an emerging technology may fall 
within the scope of an existing rule despite being irrelevant to its goals.237 
Consider the following scenario. A hypothetical city ordinance prohibits the use 
of motorcycles in a park frequented by birdwatchers because motorcycles are 
loud and would scare away the birds. Ten years after the ordinance is passed, 
engineers develop a new technology which allows motorcyclists to operate their 
vehicles silently. If the ordinance remained unchanged, motorcycles would still 
be excluded from the park, even though doing so would no longer serve the 
purpose of the ordinance. This overbreadth would mean that the new technology 
would itself be legal, but its utility and potential benefits could be substantially 
limited, at least in so far as one intended benefit of the technology was to open 
more public spaces to motorcyclists.  
																																								 																				
233 See, e.g., Google Letter, supra note 216 (seeking clarification on this matter under FMVSS); see 
also Smith, supra note 7, at 463–80 (considering this question under a range of existing state laws). 
234 See Smith, supra note 7, at 464 n.307 (listing virtually every different state, federal, and 
international law definition of “driver” and “operator”). 
235 See Smith, supra note 7, at 476–80 (exploring these possibilities); see also Jack Karsten 
& Darrell West, The State of Self-Driving Car Laws Across the U.S., BROOKINGS (May 1, 
2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2018/05/01/the-state-of-self-driving-car-
laws-across-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/THW9-LJMB] (“[I]ndividual states . . . differ on 
basics like the definition of ‘vehicle operator.’ Tennessee SB 151 points to the autonomous 
driving system (ADS), while Texas SB 2205 designates a ‘natural person’ riding in the 
vehicle. Meanwhile, Georgia SB 219 identifies the operator as the person who causes the 
ADS to engage, which might happen remotely in a vehicle fleet.”). 
236 See Moses, supra note 147, at 260-64 (discussing superfluous mandates in the context of 
over-inclusive rules resulting from technologic change). 
237 Id.  
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In most states, these same types of unnecessary limitations and 
requirements are imposed on autonomous vehicles. The aim of state vehicle 
codes, for instance, is to maximize the safety of vehicle operators and 
pedestrians. To that end, all states prohibit individuals from either “driving,” 
“operating” or “being in control” of a motor vehicle while intoxicated.238 These 
laws make sense if a natural person is the one actually controlling the vehicle. If 
a natural person is only a passenger in a fully automated vehicle, however, it 
makes far less sense to prohibit that person from riding in the vehicle while 
intoxicated. Nevertheless, the vehicle codes in some states may still categorize 
the human passenger in an autonomous vehicle as its “driver” or “operator.”239 
In such states, simply riding in an autonomous vehicle while intoxicated would 
likely constitute the unlawful act of intoxicated driving. Thus, to the extent that 
one purpose of autonomous vehicles is to increase mobility while improving 
public safety, these laws would add legal uncertainty for investors and 
undermine at least one potential benefit of the technology.240 
 
b. Reduced Public Confidence in Safety 
 
In addition to legal uncertainty, regulatory inaction can also undermine 
public confidence in the safety of a new technology. The importance of public 
confidence cannot be overstated.241 If consumers are unwilling to purchase or 
																																								 																				
238 See James O. Pearson, Jr., What Constitutes Driving, Operating, or Being in Control of 
Motor Vehicle for Purposes of Driving While Intoxicated Statute or Ordinance, 93 A.L.R. 
3d 7 (1979) (compiling drunk-driving laws). 
239 See supra notes 232-35 and accompanying text. 
240 The same is true of distracted driving laws, which could prevent autonomous vehicle 
passengers from engaging in productive activities while on the road. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 
47, § 11-901b (“The operator of every vehicle, while driving, shall devote their full time and 
attention to such driving.”); GA. CODE § 40-6-241 (prohibiting drivers from “engag[ing] in any 
actions which [would] distract [the] driver from the safe operation of [a] vehicle”); ARK. CODE § 
27-51-104 (prohibiting any person from “driv[ing] or operat[ing] any vehicle in such a careless 
manner as to evidence a failure to keep a proper lookout for other traffic, vehicular or otherwise, 
or in such a manner as to evidence a failure to maintain proper control”).  
241 See Barack Obama, Self-Driving, Yes, But Also Safe, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 19, 
2016, http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/Op-Ed/2016/09/19/Barack-Obama-Self-driving-yes-
but-also-safe/stories/201609200027 [https://perma.cc/RH35-7XXX] (“The quickest way to slam 
the brakes on innovation is for the public to lose confidence in the safety of new technologies.”); 
Gregory N. Mandel, Emerging Technology Governance, in INNOVATIVE GOVERNANCE MODELS 
FOR EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 60 (Gary E. Marchant et al. eds., 2013) (“[P]ublic confidence in 
an emerging technology and its governance is critical to the success of the technology.”); Douglas 
J. Sylvester et al., Not Again! Public Perception, Regulation, and Nanotechnology, 3 REG. & 
GOVERNANCE 165, 168 (2009) (“[P]ublic opinion is crucial to the success and integration of new 
technologies. If the public turns against a technology, its likelihood of success (however defined) 
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use a new technology due to concerns about safety—whether justified or not—
then the potential benefits of a new technology are virtually guaranteed to 
remain unrealized.242 Importantly, the degree to which a technology is 
regulated relates to public confidence in at least two ways. First, to the extent 
that imposing minimum safety standards on a new technology actually reduces 
the probability of harmful events, the regulated technology is likely to be 
perceived as safer.243 Since most people first hear about a new technology 
through the media,244 highly publicized incidents involving the technology 
could cause people to overestimate its risks.245 Second, a growing body of 
research suggests that public confidence in unfamiliar technologies depends at 
least in part on their level of regulation.246 This may be especially true in the 
wake of high-profile accidents involving such technologies.247 
																																								 																				
is greatly reduced.”); Lynn L. Bergeson, Avoid Mistakes of the Past: Develop Nano Responsibly, 
22 ENVTL. L. F. 41, 41 (2005) (arguing that “the public’s perception of safety is essential” and 
that “no emerging technology will survive without broad public support”). 
242 Cf. Lin, supra note 6, at 378 (“[P]ublic mistrust and suspicion . . . can ultimately hamper 
even beneficial uses of a new technology.”). 
243 Cf. Matthew T. Wansley, Regulation of Emerging Risks, 69 VAND. L. REV. 401, 471 
(2016) (“Federal regulation [can] significantly reduce the risk of reverse entrenchment by 
controlling experimentation and ensuring that all firms take sufficient care to avoid [harmful 
events] that could impede public acceptance [of new technologies].”). 
244 See, e.g., JANE MACOUBRIE, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, INFORMED 
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF NANOTECHNOLOGY AND TRUST IN GOVERNMENT 8 (2005) (finding res-
pondents most likely to have heard of nanotechnology a media source first). 
245 See W. Kip Viscusi, Alarmist Decisions with Divergent Risk Information, 107 ECON. J. 1657, 
1668 (1997) (finding that that consumers often misperceive the risks they face and overemphasize 
information claiming high risks); Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, 
and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 82 (2002) (“[V]ivid images and concrete pictures of disaster can 
‘crowd out’ other kinds of thoughts, including the crucial thought that the probability of a disaster 
is really small.”); Sylvester et al., supra note 241, at 175 (“As the media and interest groups 
emphasize certain risks, the images they create can overwhelm objective information.”). 
246 See, e.g., MACOUBRIE, supra note 244, at 19 (finding this to be true in the context of 
nanotechnology); Christian Gollier & Nicholas Treich, Decision-Making Under Scientific 
Uncertainty, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 77, 97 (2003) (discussing some of the empirical 
research); see also Marchant et al., supra note 119, at 725 (“[I]t seems that the establishment of a 
regulatory scheme is a prerequisite for maintaining public trust, providing another rationale for 
adoption of regulation beyond the substantive need for such provisions.”); Moses, supra note 124, 
at 526 (“Sometimes, the mere exercise of centralized control can allay public fears as to the 
direction the technology might otherwise take.”); William Birnbauer, Nano Could be a Huge 
Future Health Crisis, THE AGE (Oct. 30, 2005), https://www.theage.com.au/national/nano-could-
be-a-huge-future-health-crisis-20051030-ge1561.html (arguing in the context of nanotechnology 
that “[t]he early introduction and explanation of regulation reduces the risk that public concern 
will prevent acceptance” of a technology). 
247 Cf. MACOUBRIE, supra note 244, at 10 (finding that public perceptions of nanotechnology, 
which tend to favor greater regulation, also correlate to concerns about past high-profile 
 Journal of Law & Public Affairs  [Nov. 2018 
 
	
128 
There is already data to suggest that consumers harbor serious concerns 
about the safety of autonomous vehicles and their lack of oversight.248 
According to a recent study, only one in four U.S. consumers would trust an 
autonomous vehicle to transport them as a passenger.249 These misgivings were 
on full display following several crashes involving fully and partially automated 
vehicles in 2017 and 2018.250 As one commentator rushed to note following an 
accident involving a Tesla vehicle, “[t]he race . . . to develop self-driving cars 
has been fueled by the belief that computers can operate a vehicle more safely 
than human drivers, but that view is now in question.”251 Consistent with that 
reaction, consumer trust in autonomous vehicle safety has slipped in the wake of 
these incidents252 and a number of commentators and politicians have called for 
																																								 																				
“environmental . . . and human health errors”); cf. also notes 252‒53 (discussing the paucity 
of autonomous vehicle regulations, the drop in consumer confidence following high-profile 
accidents involving autonomous vehicles, and the subsequent calls for greater regulation).  
248 See generally ADVOCATES FOR HIGHWAY & AUTO SAFETY, CARAVAN PUBLIC OPINION 
POLL: DRIVERLESS CARS (2018) (surveying consumer attitudes toward autonomous vehicles 
and finding that significant segments of the U.S. population are skeptical of autonomous 
vehicle safety); Fact Sheet: Vehicle Technology Survey – Phase IIIB, AAA (May 22, 2018), 
https://publicaffairsresources.aaa.biz/download/10980/ (same); WORLD ECON. FORUM, 
SELF-DRIVING VEHICLES IN AN URBAN CONTEXT (2015); BRANDON SCHOETTLE & MICHAEL 
SIVAK, UNIV. OF MICH. TRANSP. RESEARCH INST., A SURVEY OF PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT 
AUTONOMOUS AND SELF-DRIVING VEHICLES IN THE U.S., U.K., AND AUSTRALIA (2014); see 
also Nikhil Menon, Consumer Perception and Anticipated Adoption of Autonomous Vehicle 
Technology: Results from Multi-Population Survey 6-10 (Oct. 27, 2015) (unpublished M.A. 
thesis, University of South Florida) (on file with author) (summarizing much of the empirical 
research on consumer attitudes toward autonomous vehicles). 
249 See Craig Giffi et al., The Race to Autonomous Driving: Winning American Consumers’ Trust, 
20 DELOITTE REV. 74, 85 (finding 74% of U.S. consumers believe that autonomous vehicles are 
unsafe); Fact Sheet: Vehicle Technology Survey– Phase IIIB, supra note 248 (same); ADVOCATES 
FOR HIGHWAY & AUTO SAFETY, supra note 248, at 2 (finding the same for 64% of consumers). 
250 See, e.g., Paul Eistenstein, Fatal Crash Could Pull Plug on Autonomous Vehicle Testing 
on Public Roads, NBC NEWS (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/autos/ 
fatal-crash-could-pull-plug-autonomous-vehicle-testing-public-roads-n858151 [https://perma.cc/ 
4Z8B-4JRD] (reporting on consumer, industry, and lawmaker reactions to these incidents). 
251 Bill Vlasic & Neal E. Boudette, Self-Driving Tesla Was Involved in Fatal Crash, U.S. 
Says, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/01/business/self-
driving-tesla-fatal-crash-investigation.html. 
252 Compare Fact Sheet: Vehicle Technology Survey – Phase IIIB, supra note 248, at 1 
(finding that, in April 2018, 73% of U.S. consumers “would be afraid to ride in a fully self-
driving vehicle”) with Fact Sheet: Vehicle Technology Survey – Phase III, AAA (Jan. 24, 
2018), https://publicaffairsresources.aaa.biz/download/9852/ (finding that, in December 
2017, 63% of U.S. consumers “would be afraid to ride in  a fully self-driving vehicle”); see 
also Andrew J. Hawkins, Self-Driving Car Crashes Put a Dent in Consumer Trust, Poll Says, 
The VERGE (May 22, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/22/17380374/self-driving-
car-crash-consumer-trust-poll-aaa (reporting on the drop in consumer confidence).  
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increased government oversight.253 In the autonomous vehicle industry, where 
success is dependent on convincing people to switch from active driving to 
passive riding, doubts about vehicle safety could pose a serious threat to 
widespread commercial adoption.254  
Indeed, as illustrated throughout history, a single incident involving a 
new technology can undermine years of development and marketing.255 The 
infamous explosion that destroyed the Hindenburg in 1937 is perhaps the 
most vivid example, but other high profile incidents involving nuclear 
power,256 genetically modified foods,257 and gene therapy258 have spurred 
similar levels of public angst and industry collapse. As one scholar observes, 
“each of these incidents sparked subsequent official investigations and media 
																																								 																				
253 See, e.g., Ross Marchand, Put Driverless Cars Back in the Slow Lane, REALCLEARPOLICY 
(Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.realclearpolicy.com/articles/2018/02/15/put_driverless_cars_ 
back_in_the_slow_lane_110511.html (“In light of these data, policymakers must press for 
more safety before permitting driverless vehicles on the open road without human testers.”); 
Sam Thielman, ‘Someone is Going to Die’: Experts Warn Lawmakers Over Self-Driving 
Cars, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/mar 
/15/self-driving-cars-danger-senate-general-motors-google (“The robot car revolution hit a 
speed bump . . . as senators and tech experts sounded stern warnings about the potentially 
fatal risks of self-driving cars.”). 
254 See Wansley, supra note 243, at 470 (arguing that “early, high profile collisions” could 
“turn public sentiment against” autonomous vehicles and impede their development); see 
also Sven A. Beiker, Legal Aspects of Autonomous Driving, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1145, 
1152 (2012) (“It is unclear how . . . the public will react to accidents involving robotic cars. 
Overreaction is a clear danger, even if it could be shown that a transition to autonomous 
vehicles leads to far fewer traffic-related deaths.”). 
255 See Marchant et al., supra note 119, at 725 (“[A] single incident gone awry [can] 
undermin[e] years of careful planning and building of regulatory system.”); see also 
CALESTOUS JUMA, INNOVATION AND ITS ENEMIES: WHY PEOPLE RESIST NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES (2016) (discussing examples of resistance to new technologies). 
256 See JOHN D. GRAHAM, THE HERITAGE FOUND., THE PERILS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE: LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 3 (2004) 
(suggesting that there has been “a de facto moratorium on construction of nuclear power 
plants” in the United States since the accident at Three Mile Island); see also J. V. 
REES, HOSTAGES OF EACH OTHER: THE TRANSFORMATION OF NUCLEAR SAFETY SINCE 
THREE MILE ISLAND (1994) (examining the Three Mile Island nuclear accident and its impact 
on the nuclear power industry). 
257 See Mandel, supra note 241, at 47-48 (“The early stages of genetically modified food 
development in the United States provides a poster-child example of how significant public 
concern over a technology—and the perception that it is not being managed properly—can 
thwart technological development.”). 
258 Rick Weiss & Deborah Nelson, Gene Therapy’s Troubling Crossroads: A Death Raises 
Questions of Ethics, Profit, Science, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 1999), http://www.washington 
post.com/wp-srv/WPcap/1999-12/31/055r-123199-idx.html (exploring the death of a 
participant in a gene therapy clinical trial). 
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scrutiny that revealed significant flaws and failures in the regulatory system,” 
the results of which “severely undermined public trust in both the technology 
at issue . . . and the regulatory programs responsible for the oversight of that 
technology.”259 It is true that taking regulatory action does not guarantee that 
a new technology will escape negative publicity or scrutiny of its oversight; 
however, common sense suggests that inaction increases both the probability 
of accidents and the severity of public fallout. 
 
2. Potential Drawbacks of Regulatory Action 
 
Despite the potential drawbacks of responding to the pacing problem 
through inaction, responses based on regulatory action can also have a 
number of drawbacks. As described above, there are, broadly speaking, two 
potential affirmative responses to the pacing problem: a precautionary 
approach and a future-facing approach. The future-facing approach can be 
further broken down into regulations which mandate specific characteristics 
or forms of a technology and regulations which are technology neutral. I 
address the drawbacks of each in turn. 
 
a. Precautionary Principle: Forgone Benefits and Stunted Innovation 
 
The aim of a regulatory approach informed by the precautionary 
principle is to temporarily slow or halt the development of a new technology 
until it is explicitly proven safe.260 As a response to the pacing problem, a 
precautionary approach provides regulators with additional time and 
information to design and enact regulatory regimes which are calibrated to 
the idiosyncrasies of unfamiliar new technologies.261 Although information 
about the risks and applications of an emerging technology are important 
considerations when drafting regulations, and regulators may otherwise 
struggle to effectively manage such risks in a timely manner, there are two 
major drawbacks to artificially constraining the rate at which a new 
technology can develop.262  
																																								 																				
259 Marchant et al., supra note 119, at 725. 
260 See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text. 
261 Id. 
262 For a comprehensive summary of precautionary principle critiques, see Wood et al., supra 
note 154, at 589–607. Two additional problems worth noting are the lack of a consensus definition 
of the precautionary principle, see Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution in a Multi-Risk World, in 
HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1513 (Dennis J. 
Paustenbach ed., 2002) (recognizing that there is no single definition for the precautionary 
principle and that existing definitions are “varied” and “often vague”), and disagreements over 
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First, using law to slow or halt the development of a new technology 
forces consumers to forgo its potential benefits.263 This is a seemingly obvious 
consideration, but the “benefits of [new] activities are commonly ignored when 
[precautionary] regulation is contemplated.”264 In the case of autonomous 
vehicles, for example, regulators in California recently considered an indefinite 
moratorium on the private sale and commercial use of autonomous vehicles.265 
Although they ultimately decided against it, the move would have allowed 
regulators to collect additional information and extend the lifespan of their 
initial rules. At the same time, however, preventing the sale of autonomous 
vehicles, or even simply mandating that a licensed driver always be present in 
“the driver seat of the vehicle,”266 would have prevented the public from 
realizing many of the potential benefits of autonomous vehicles.267 Some of 
the forgone benefits, such as any reduction in the number of traffic fatalities 
attributable to human error, would have been easily quantifiable, while others, 
such as increased mobility and independence for the elderly and disabled, 
would have been much harder to quantify.  
																																								 																				
what constitutes an acceptable level of risk, see Julian Morris, Defining the Precautionary 
Principle, in RETHINKING RISK AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 1-19 (Julian Morris ed., 
2000) (distinguishing between “strong” and “weak” versions of the precautionary principle).  
263 See Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 851, 882-98 (1996) (arguing that the forgone benefits of new technologies are a significant 
cost of taking a precautionary approach); see also Henry I. Miller & Gregory Conko, Precaution 
Without Principle, 19 NATURE BIOTECH. 302, 302 (2001) (“What is missing from the 
precautionary calculus is an acknowledgment that even when technologies introduce new risks, 
most confer net benefits; that is, their use reduces many other, far more serious hazards.”).  
264 Cross, supra note 263, at 882. 
265 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 227.68 (proposed Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.dmv.ca. 
gov/portal/wcm/connect/ed6f78fe-fe38-4100-b5c21656f555e841/AVExpressTerms.pdf?M 
OD=AJPERES.  
266 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 227.52(a)(5) (proposed Dec. 16, 2015) (requiring the presence 
of “an operator,” defined as a person “sitting in the driver seat of the vehicle,” at all times). 
267 See Caleb Watney & Marc Scribner, Slowing Down Driverless Cars Would be a Fatal 
Mistake, TECHDIRT (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20180302/100450 
39339/slowing-down-driverless-cars-would-be-fatal-mistake.shtml (“As a society, we can't 
afford to wait until we are 100-percent certain that driverless cars are statistically safer than 
humans before letting them on the roads.”); Ian Adams, Thoughtless Bureaucrats and Driverless 
Cars, CITY JOURNAL (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.city-journal.org/html/thoughtless-bureaucrats-
and-driverless-cars-14289.html (“Why would the state pursue policies to discourage the adoption 
of vehicles that, by virtually all accounts, would be orders of magnitude safer than traditionally 
operated vehicles?”). Indeed, one study estimates that it would take tens or even hundreds of years 
to log sufficient miles on closed courses to adequately assess the safety of the vehicles when 
compared to conventional vehicles. See NIDHI KALRA & SUSAN M. PADDOCK, DRIVING TO 
SAFETY: HOW MANY MILES OF DRIVING WOULD IT TAKE TO DEMONSTRATE AUTONOMOUS 
VEHICLE RELIABILITY? 10-11 (2016). 
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In addition, blocking or slowing the emergence of a new technology may 
prevent the technology from achieving commercial viability or lead to a stunted 
version of the technology.268 Although the precautionary principle does not aim 
to ban all new technologies in perpetuity, constraining the development of a new 
technology in its nascent stages may nevertheless preclude the type of 
“experimentation and failure” necessary to develop an optimal product.269 
Moreover, to the extent that a technology is excluded from the marketplace or a 
stunted version is introduced, developers may struggle to establish a viable 
consumer base.270 The requirement in some states, for instance, that autonomous 
vehicles contain a licensed driver at all times, as well as the numerous references 
to the “driver” or “operator” in existing FMVSS, could channel innovation away 
from full automation—the technology with the greatest potential benefit—and 
eliminate a sizable portion of the consumer base for autonomous vehicles, 
including elderly and disabled persons without drivers licenses and autonomous 
ridesharing companies.271 
 
b. Future-Facing Mandates: Choosing the Wrong Path for a New 
Technology 
 
Second, future-facing mandates designed to minimize regulatory 
revision, such as technology-specific designs or safety standards, also have 
the potential to stunt the development of an emerging technology.272 
Although attempting to anticipate or shape the evolution of a new technology 
																																								 																				
268 See Thierer, supra note 169, at 362-63; cf. also Cross, supra note 263, at 898-907 (describing 
how taking too many precautions may lead to a stunted and less safe version of a new technology). 
269 THIERER, supra note 168, at 27; see also GRAHAM, supra note 256, at 3 (“By its very 
nature, technological innovation occurs through a process of trial-and-error and refinement, 
and this process could be disrupted by an inflexible version of the precautionary principle.”); 
Demissie, supra note 1, at 343 (“[T]he precautionary principle cannot ensure safety without 
hindering innovation and development.”). 
270 Cf. THIERER, supra note 168, at 28 (arguing that, “[i]n practical terms, the precautionary 
principle results in . . . lower-quality goods, higher prices, diminished economic growth, and 
a decline in the overall standard of living”). 
271 See supra note 88 (listing state laws requiring the presence of a licensed human driver); 
ANITA KIM ET AL., supra note 216, at 3-4, 17-25 (identifying every use of the terms “driver” 
and “operator” in the FMVSS). 
272 See Lyria Bennett Moses, Sui Generis Rules, in THE GROWING GAP BETWEEN EMERGING 
TECHNOLOGIES AND LEGAL-ETHICAL OVERSIGHT 86-87 (2011) (providing an overview of 
potential problems with laws which “assume a particular state of technology”). But cf. ORG. 
FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., AUTOMATED AND AUTONOMOUS DRIVING: REGULATION 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY 27 (2015) [hereinafter OECD REPORT] (noting that “[p]roactive 
policy, including specific rules, can provide companies the legal clarity they need to make 
investment and deployment decisions”). 
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is a natural response to the limited reactive and adaptive capabilities of 
regulatory institutions, it requires a level of foresight virtually impossible for 
lawmakers and regulators to achieve.273 “It is an unhappy fact of life,” Grant 
Gilmore famously wrote, “that, while we can know the past only imperfectly, 
we know the future not at all.”274 The consequences of wrongly forecasting 
the evolution of a new technology, or attempting to shape its development 
based on incomplete information or faulty assumptions, can be significant.275 
A future-facing regulation, for example, can “lock in one pathway to 
[adoption of a technology] over . . . potentially better one[s]” or “freeze 
unrealistic expectations—high or low—into the law,”276 resulting in an 
inferior technology forged by forces external to the market.277 
																																								 																				
273 See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 993 (1995) (“Those 
who issue a rule cannot know the full range of situations to which the rule will be applied, 
and in the new circumstances, the rule may be hopelessly outmoded.”); Eugene Volokh, 
Technology and the Future of Law, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1375, 1375-76 (1995) (identifying four 
failures of technological prediction); Grant Gilmore, On Statutory Obsolescence, 39 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 461, 467 (1967) (“Our best informed guesses about what is going to happen 
next have an uncomfortable habit of missing the mark completely.”); Sarewitz, supra note 
173, at 97 (providing that, “efforts to predict technological pathways as an input into 
decision-making have been failures, and often absurd failures at that”); see also Obama, 
supra note 241 (“Government sometimes gets it wrong when it comes to rapidly changing 
technologies.”). 
274 Gilmore, supra note 273, at 467. As former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
observed: “[T]here are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know 
there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. 
But there are also unknown unknowns -- the ones we don't know we don't know. . .[I]t is the 
latter category that tends to be the difficult ones.” Donald Rumsfeld, Remarks at Department 
of Defense News Briefing (Feb. 12, 2002), http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript 
.aspx?TranscriptID=2636. 
275 See Moses, supra note 272, at 87 (“Rules that assume a particular technological framework 
are not only potentially distorting from a legal perspective, but they may distort technology as 
well. Potential avenues for technological change may remain unexplored in order to remain within 
the technological paradigm assumed beneficial by a law. Alternatively, technology may be 
redesigned in socially and economically unproductive ways in order to avoid the application of 
onerous regulation.”); see also Jonathan B. Wiener, The Regulation of Technology and the 
Technology of Regulation, 26 TECH. IN SOC’Y 483, 489 (2004) (“Technology requirements, 
intended to force industry . . . to upgrade, may foster the diffusion of existing technology across 
industry, but ironically may stagnate innovation of new technologies by specifying a particular 
technology and giving no incentives for further improvements.”). 
276 OECD REPORT, supra note 272, at 6. 
277 See Scribner, supra note 171, at 1 (contending that, “laws and regulations that narrow the 
scope of permissible development, testing, and operational functionality risk locking in inferior 
technology, delaying adoption, and increasing prices faced by consumers”); see also Birnhack, 
supra note 189, at 43 (“[A] legislative endorsement of one particular technology might cause a 
technological lock-in: the chosen technology will be used even if there are superior technologies. 
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The risks of future-facing regulatory mandates are particularly acute 
in the context of autonomous vehicles.278 There are multiple competing 
manifestations of the technology currently under development279 and 
numerous visions for how autonomous vehicles should be introduced to 
consumers.280 It would be virtually impossible for state or federal regulators 
to determine which pathway would be best or to predict the precise pathway 
along which autonomous vehicles will actually develop.281 The autonomous 
vehicle industry, recognizing this fact, has protested vocally against 
regulations which purport to do just that.282 “It’s really hard to try and 
																																								 																				
Once a technology is implemented and widely used, there are costs of switching to other 
technologies . . . . If the switching costs are higher than the perceived benefit, a technological 
lock-in would occur, even though the locked-in technology is inferior to newer ones.”). 
278 See NHTSA POLICY 2016, supra note 8, at 79 (recognizing that, “given the speed and 
extent of [technological] evolution, even the most performance-oriented and forward-
looking [autonomous vehicle] testing protocols rapidly could become out-of-date, ineffectual 
and even obstructive”). 
279 See RAND REPORT, supra note 8, at 58-72 (describing the range of autonomous vehicle 
technologies and configurations currently available and under development); RICHARD T. 
BAKER & JASON WAGNER, POLICY PATHWAYS TO VEHICLE AUTOMATION 431 (2013) 
(same); see also Bryant Walker Smith, How Governments Can Promote Automated Driving, 
47 N.M. L. REV. 99 (2017) (arguing that there are at least three different technological 
pathways to fully automated vehicles). 
280 See, e.g., BAKER & WAGNER, supra note 279, at 431-36 (compiling the competing visions 
of several industry representatives); Eva Fraedrich & Sven Beiker, Transition Pathways to 
Fully Automated Driving and Its Implications for the Sociotechnical System of Automobility, 
3 EUR. J. FUTURES RESEARCH 1, 5-11 (describing three possible “sociotechnical transition 
scenarios”); CTR. FOR AUTOMOTIVE RESEARCH, SELF-DRIVING CARS: THE NEXT 
REVOLUTION 16-17 (2012) (describing three “possible adoption scenarios”). 
281 See Jeff Wise, How to Make Self-Driving Cars Safe, HEWLETT PACKARD ENTERPRISE 
(July 11, 2017), https://www.hpe.com/us/en/insights/articles/autonomous-vehicles-need-reg 
ulation-but-who-designs-the-standards-1707.html (“It's important to recognize that we're 
very much in early days; there's a lot we don't know; and whatever predictions we might 
make, they're probably going to be completely wrong . . . .”); Alexander Hars, Five Guiding 
Principles for Autonomous Vehicle Policy, DRIVERLESS-FUTURE.COM (Oct. 20, 2014), 
http://www.driverless-future.com/?p=683 (“There are so many paths that this technology can 
take, so many changes in many different areas of business and society, so many proponents 
and possibly opponents that it is hard to be right about the path of technology and – 
consequently – of law.”); Mark Scribner, Driverless Cars Are on the Way: Here’s How Not 
to Regulate Them, WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ 
driverless-cars-are-on-the-way-heres-how-not-to-regulate-them/2012/11/02/a5337880-21f1 
-11e2-ac85-e669876c6a24_story.html?utm_term=.8543436a5d58 (“[N]o one knows precis-
ely how autonomous vehicle technology will develop or be adopted by consumers . . . .”). 
282 See, e.g., Alex Davies, Self-Driving Cars are Legal, But Real Rules Would be Nice, 
WIRED (May 15, 2015) https://www.wired.com/2015/05/self-driving-cars-legal-real-rules-
nice/ (quoting industry representatives on their strong concerns with respect to the impact of 
future-facing regulations); see also Moore, supra note 182 (“Fearing that the technology’s 
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anticipate how the technology might be used in the future and write laws for 
every eventuality,” Google recently stated through a spokesperson, and “[w]e 
think policymakers should learn about the technology and see how people 
want to use it first before putting a ceiling on innovation.”283 As one 
commentator argues, future-facing mandates which “narrow the scope of  
permissible development, testing, and operational functionality” of 
autonomous vehicles risk “locking in inferior technology, delaying adoption, 
and increasing prices faced by consumers.”284 
 
c. Technology-Neutral Laws: Linear Innovation and  
High Compliance Costs 
 
Finally, technology-neutral regulation, which rejects the rigid 
specificity of future-facing mandates, can also create barriers to the 
emergence of new technologies. Technology-neutral laws are designed to be 
independent of any particular technological context and use “broad, open-
textured” language to increase the flexibility of regulations and avoid future 
revisions based on technological advances.285 Like future-facing mandates, 
the aim of technology-neutral laws—to minimize reliance on the rulemaking 
machinery of regulatory institutions—is an intuitive response to the pacing 
problem. Despite its intuitive appeal, however, reliance on technological 
neutrality can stymie the development of emerging technologies in two 
important ways. 
First, although such rules purport to be untethered from specific 
technologies and sufficiently flexible to handle future developments, 
technology-neutral laws are still constrained by the unpredictable nature of 
innovation.286 “In the abstract,” Brad Greenberg argues, “legislators can say 
																																								 																				
development could be stifled, Google has lobbied state lawmakers nationwide not to advance 
any bills, even if they seem innocuous.”). As an Audi spokesperson remarked in the article: 
“We see a danger of actions taken too early to govern piloted driving 10 to 20 years into the 
future. Such laws would have little application to initial levels of piloted driving that will 
emerge over the next few years. They could also jeopardize robust research needs.” Davies, 
supra note 282. 
283 Davies, supra note 282. 
284 Scribner, supra note 171, at 1; see also NHTSA POLICY 2016, supra note 8, at 79 (“The 
greater the amount of detail that is included in [autonomous vehicle] testing protocols to 
maximize safety performance or address risks believed to be associated with current HAVs, 
the greater the likelihood that detail might limit the use of future technologies.”). 
285 Greenberg, supra note 189, at 1513. 
286 See Moses, supra note 124, at 578 (“Language cannot be completely technology-neutral; 
it is impossible to draft legislation with sufficient precision and clarity that addresses every 
possible future technical variation.”). 
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that they want an unknown B to be treated like a known A.”287 However, until 
the “nature and capabilities of B are understood—until legislators have some 
appreciation for how the law  will affect B, and the attendant welfare costs 
and benefits—it is impossible to evaluate the extent to which the law actually 
should treat B like A.”288 Moreover, when lawmakers and regulators draft 
new rules, they “[do] so from the vantage point of contemporary 
technological limitations . . . [and] with extant technology in mind.”289 Thus, 
Greenberg continues, “[l]ike the nineteenth-century farmer who imagines a 
sharper plow but is unable to foresee the combustion engine, [regulators] 
imagine linear advances from extant technology.”290 This can lead not only 
to obsolescence, a problem in its own right, but laws which are poorly tailored 
to future technologies or inadvertently discourage radical innovation. 
Second, technology-neutral laws can generate high compliance costs 
for market participants. When applied to new technologies, the inherently 
vague and flexible terms of technology-neutral laws may prove ambiguous 
or have an unclear purpose, scope, or effect.291 In particular, given the lack 
of specificity in such laws, the task of finding purpose or meaning in their 
terms and providing guidance to market participants often falls to the 
courts.292 In areas of law heavily reliant on technology-neutral rules, 
however, this lack of specificity has led to inconsistent and confusing 
results.293 Where technology-neutral laws produce uncertainty with respect 
to the scope or effect of a regulation, market participants must expend 
additional resources on regulatory compliance and evaluating the risks of 
investment; some developers may even respond to this uncertainty by exiting 
the market or deferring investment.294 In the context of autonomous vehicles, 
																																								 																				
287 Greenberg, supra note 189, at 1526. 
288 Id.  
289 Id. at 1527.  
290 Id. 
291 Cf. id. at 1524-43 (describing these problems in the context of copyright law); cf. also 
Moses, supra note 147, at 276-77 (“[I]t is often impossible to draft a rule that will be both 
operationally effective and immune from problems related to technological change.”). 
292 See, e.g., Paul M. Janicke, On the Cause of Unpredictability of Federal Circuit Decisions 
in Patent Cases, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 93, 94 (2005) (“Patent statutes in the United 
States have always been written in broad terms, leaving it to the courts to fill in details as 
cases arise.”); Greenberg, supra note 189, at 1524-43 (describing the extensive litigation 
stemming from problems of definition, scope, and consistency in copyright law). 
293 See, e.g., Janicke, supra note 292, at 95-96 (arguing that technology-neutral language in 
patent law “can hardly be expected to lead to predictability in the outcomes of court 
resolution of the issues”). 
294 See Birnhack, supra note 189, at 44 (“[T]he open-ended nature of a technology-neutral 
legislation might have a chilling effect on developers of technology. Not knowing in advance 
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where NHTSA has fallen back on its technology-neutral recall authority as 
the primary mechanism for ensuring safety, industry participants have 
warned that there is little clarity as to how the “unreasonable risk” standard 
might apply to their products.295 At a moment when clarity is at a premium 
for industry participants and consumers, reliance on technology-neutral laws 
and regulations could lead to significant uncertainty for all parties.296 
 
III. RETHINKING THE REGULATION OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES AND 
OTHER RAPIDLY EVOLVING TECHNOLOGIES 
 
The previous Part outlined three common responses to the pacing 
problem, illustrated how these responses have manifested themselves in  
the context of autonomous vehicle regulation, and described the obstacles 
created by each to the widespread commercial adoption of rapidly evolving 
technologies like autonomous vehicles. In essence, regulators of autonomous 
vehicles and other emerging technologies face a maddening catch-22. On  
the one hand, the less they regulate or the broader they phrase regulations, 
the more disconnected law may become from its target or the less clarity  
and certainty enjoyed by regulated entities and consumers.297 On the other 
hand, the more certainty and confidence regulators attempt to provide  
entities and consumers, the more likely it is that regulations will become 
outdated, generate future ambiguities and uncertainty, or pigeonhole a 
developing technology.298 In both cases, if regulators block or slow a 
technology until its likely developmental path and risks are fully understood, 
																																								 																				
how the law might address their technology, they might refrain from pursuing it, perhaps to 
the detriment of all. Details and specification can provide certainty.”). 
295 See, e.g., Ryan Hagemann, Niskanen Ctr., Comments Submitted to the National Highway 
Transportation Safety Administration in the Matter of: Federal Automated Vehicle Policy 
NHTSA-2016-0090 at 7 (Nov. 21, 2016), https://niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/20 
16/11/CommentsAutonomousVehicleStandardsNHTSA.pdf (offering examples and con-
cluding that “a great deal of clarification will be needed for outlining the specifics of when 
a recall order would be justified in the case of autonomous vehicles”); see also Skees, supra 
note 64 (arguing that NHTSA’s 2017 policy statement “lacks a clear interpretation for either 
innovators or other policymakers. This may . . . increase regulatory uncertainty that stifles 
development”). 
296 Cf. Mike Ramsey, Autonomous Vehicles Fall into the Trough of Disillusionment, FORBES 
(Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/enroute/2018/08/14/autonomous-vehicles-fall-
into-the-trough-of-disillusionment-but-thats-good/#20034c9a7b5a [https://perma.cc/UGF5-V88 
X] (reporting on Audi’s announcement that it would not sell its most advance automated 
technology in the U.S. because of a “lack of clarity on regulations”). 
297 See supra Part II.B, sections (1)(a)(ii) & (2)(c). 
298 See supra Part II.B, sections (1)(a)(i), (1)(a)(iii), & (2)(b). 
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then its benefits—including any life-saving applications—will remain 
unrealized or diluted.299 The challenge of this final Part, therefore, is to offer 
an approach to the regulation of autonomous vehicles which balances (1) the 
realization of autonomous vehicles’ potential benefits, (2) the need for public 
confidence in their safety, and (3) the potential pitfalls of future-facing 
regulations. 
A common attribute of the present and proposed regulatory responses 
to autonomous vehicles is their overwhelming focus on identifying, ex ante, 
the optimal substance for the rules governing autonomous vehicles.300 On its 
face, this is a reasonable reaction to a new regulatory challenge and the 
substance of regulations—whether prohibition, inaction, or something in-
between—is arguably the most important aspect of any regulatory 
framework. At the same time, however, focusing excessively on substance 
distracts from the root, underlying source of the regulatory challenge facing 
autonomous vehicles: their rapid evolution and the limited reactive and 
adaptive capabilities of U.S. legal institutions.301 Whether deliberately or 
subconsciously, regulators and commentators have approached autonomous 
vehicle regulation as if there is a single, optimal regulatory path waiting to be 
discovered, and it is their responsibility, ex ante, to identify that path and 
implement a corresponding framework (albeit at varying rates).302 
Nevertheless, as described in the first half of Part II, the pacing problem is 
																																								 																				
299 See supra Part II.B, section (2)(a). 
300 Whether that means deciding to refrain from enacting or promulgating new laws and 
regulations, relying on precautionary regulation, or employing specific future-facing 
regulations. Moreover, inaction is, in some cases, simply a way of buying time to draft an 
optimal regulation. See, e.g., NHTSA POLICY 2013, supra note 13, at 10 (“Because . . . the 
technical specifications for . . . automated systems are still in flux, the agency believes that 
regulation of the technical performance of automated vehicles is premature at this time.”) 
301 See supra Part II.A (discussing the lethargy of legislatures, agencies, and courts based on 
a combination of political and procedural constraints); cf. Warren E. Walker et al., Adaptive 
Policies, Policy Analysis, and Policy-Making, 128 EUR. J. OPERATIONAL RES. 282, 283 
(2001) (“For very complex systems whose behavior we cannot predict . . . . it is appropriate 
to separate the process by which policies are specified, assessed, chosen, and implemented 
from the policies themselves.”). 
302 California is a particularly poignant example, with the Department of Motor Vehicles 
toiling over a final set of regulations for nearly 6 years. See Russ Mitchell, California 
Regulations for Driverless Cars Stall as Other States Speed Ahead, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 26, 
2017), http://www.latimes.com/business/autos/la-fi-hy-driverless-regulations-california-20 
170126-story.html (describing the California DMV’s rulemaking process for autonomous 
vehicles) [https://perma.cc/8B4A-UF5H]; see also Driverless Testing and Public Use Rules 
for Autonomous Vehicles Approved, CAL. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES (Feb. 26, 2018), https:// 
www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/pubs/newsrel/2018/2018_17 [https://perma.cc/W2NC-X 
EK5] (announcing the DMV’s approval of new regulations on autonomous technology). 
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largely a function of institutional limitations related to the process of crafting 
and enacting regulations,303 and the existing substantive responses to this 
problem, particularly in the autonomous vehicle context, suffer from 
deficiencies equal to or greater than those characterizing the underlying 
problem.304These shortcomings suggest that a new approach to regulating 
under the conditions of deep uncertainty created by the rapid evolution of 
autonomous vehicle technology is needed.305 There are, no doubt, more and 
less effective ways of regulating autonomous vehicles, but it is virtually 
impossible, early in the life of a rapidly evolving technology, to identify both 
an optimal regulatory approach and establish an enduring framework, all in 
one shot.306 Instead, it makes far more sense to approach regulation in this 
context as an iterative process, with the first regulations of autonomous 
vehicles as an initial step, rather than the ultimate goal. In other words, the 
approach to regulating autonomous vehicles must shift from one informed by 
																																								 																				
303 See supra Part II.A. 
304 See supra Part II.B. There may very well be an “optimal” regulatory path, and it is my 
hope that adaptive regulation can be used to eventually find that path, but it is foolhardy to 
believe that, in the context of a paradigm shifting and rapidly evolving technology, such a 
path can be identified from the start.   
305 Annacoos Wiersema, discussing the pacing problem more generally, pointedly summarized 
the challenge facing autonomous vehicles: “[W]e live in a complex society where laws 
designed for particular purposes can have unanticipated consequences, where bureaucracy is 
too slow and cumbersome to respond quickly and efficiently enough to those consequences, 
and where the traditional structure of top-down lawmaking is under siege as too rigid, too 
hierarchical, and too contentious to achieve its goals. The world we live in, as legal writers 
spanning a range of fields tell us, requires new forms of governance.” Annecoos Wiersema, A 
Train Without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of Law and Goals in Environmental and Natural 
Resources Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239, 1241 (2008). 
306 A growing body of literature examining other rapidly evolving technologies recognizes 
as much. See, e.g., Warren E. Walker et al., Addressing Deep Uncertainty Using Adaptive 
Policies: Introduction to Section 2, 77 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 917, 919 (2010) 
(“It is clear from experience that a static policy designed for a best estimate future is unlikely 
to survive in a complex and dynamic policy setting.”); Lawrence E. McCray et al., Planned 
Adaptation in Risk Regulation: An Initial Survey of U.S. Environmental, Health, and Safety 
Regulation, 77 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 951, 952 (2010) (“Over time, things 
change. Science evolves, technology advances, and implementation costs migrate, so 
assumptions that were once reasonable can become much less supportable. When this occurs, 
the delivered benefits of a policy decision and its actual social costs may fall substantially 
out of the intended balance.”); Warren E. Walker et al., supra note 301, at 282-83 (“For very 
complex systems whose behavior we cannot predict, policies based on best estimate models 
can prove to be very fragile against unexpected events that happen all the time. . . . Such 
policies are best for a future that most certainly will not occur, and have implications for the 
future that actually occurs that are typically not examined in the course of policy design and 
analysis or even revisited as that future unfold.”) 
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the traditional paradigm emphasizing “static optimization” to one informed 
by an “evolutionary paradigm” focused on adaptability.307 Such an iterative 
model of regulation would depend upon federal and state regulatory 
institutions “designed from the outset to expect, anticipate, and be able to . . . 
recalibrate [regulations] quickly” in response to rapid technological change 
and new information about risks, benefits, and the effects of existing rules.308 
The most promising mechanism to keep autonomous vehicle regulation 
“yoked to an evolving knowledge base,” and avoid the significant social and 
technological pitfalls of regulatory inaction and prohibition, is planned adaptive 
regulation.309 Although there is no single agreed upon definition of planned 
adaptive regulation,310 a planned adaptive approach is generally characterized by 
two fundamental attributes: (1) “a prior commitment, planned early in the 
policy’s design, to subject the policy to periodic re-evaluation and potential 
revision,” and (2) “a systemic effort or mechanism planned early in the policy’s 
design, to monitor and synthesize new information for use in the re-
evaluations.”311 In turn, planned adaptive regulation “requires institutional-
																																								 																				
307 See Barbra A. Cherry & Joannes M. Bauer, Adaptive Regulation Contours of a Policy Model 
for the Internet Economy 26 (2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). As Walker et 
al. observe, consistent with my discussion of future-facing regulations in Part II, “[a] static policy 
that is crafted to be robust under a range of plausible futures is a better starting point, but is still 
not likely to perform under conditions of deep uncertainty.” Walker et al., supra note 306, at 919. 
308 Marchant, supra note 156, at 202. 
309 McCray et al., supra note 306, at 952. As Marchant explains, “[a]doptive governance derives 
from the concept of adaptive management first developed in the context of ecology to experiment 
with different policy approaches that are simultaneously undertaken with active monitoring, 
assessment, and adjustment.” Marchant, supra note 156, at 202 (citing Adaptive Environmental 
Assessment and Management and introducing the concept of adaptive management); see also Kai 
N. Lee & Jody Lawrence, Adaptive Management: Learning from the Columbia River Basin Fish 
and Wildlife Program, 16 ENVTL. L. 431, 442 n.45 (1986) (tracing the term “adaptive 
management” to Holling's book). A growing literature advocates for analogous planned adaptive 
approaches to regulation in other contexts, including drug therapy, climate change, and 
biotechnology. See generally H-G Eichler et al., Adaptive Licensing: Taking the Next Step in the 
Evolution of Drug Approval, 91 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 426 (2012) (drug 
therapy); Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing 
Uncertainty Through A Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1 (2009) (climate change); 
Kenneth Oye et al., On Revision of the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of 
Biotechnology 1 (Mar. 22, 2016) (White Paper prepared for the Biotechnology Working Group 
of the U.S. Emerging Technologies Interagency Policy Coordination Committee) (on file with 
the author) (biotechnology). In each of these contexts, regulators face a similar tradeoff between 
potentially lifesaving technologies, risks to public safety, and the need for continued consumer 
confidence in rapidly evolving and foreign technologies. 
310 Walker et al. supra note 306, at 922. 
311 INT’L RISK GOV. CTR., CONFERENCE REPORT: PLANNING ADAPTIVE RISK REGULATION 
app. 2 at 26 (2016). A planned adaptive approach to regulation, while flexible in its own 
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ization of monitoring-adjustment frameworks that allow incremental policy and 
decision adjustments,” ex post, “where performance results can be evaluated and 
the new information can be fed back into the ongoing regulatory process.”312 A 
carefully conceived “framework for altering course, rapidly and frequently if 
conditions warrant,” is thus an “essential ingredient[]”of a planned adaptive 
approach to regulation in any context.313  
In the context of autonomous vehicles, a planned adaptive approach 
to design and operation would consist of four general dimensions: (1) initial 
regulation, (2) intensive data collection, (3) independent assessment and 
recommendations, and (4) agency consideration of recommendations and 
adjustment.314 The first dimension, initial regulation, would not represent a 
significant departure from the present notice and comment process and would 
largely mirror the process in which NHTSA and select state departments of 
transportation are currently engaged.315 The aim of initial regulations, 
																																								 																				
way, is distinct from “flexible regulation,” as used in the administrative law literature. See, 
e.g., Lori S. Bennear & Cary Coglianese, Flexible Approaches to Environmental Regulation 
1 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Pub. Law Research Paper No. 12-05, 2012). Whereas the term 
“flexibility” is often used in reference to regulatory commands, targets, consequences, and 
sources, id., the flexibility envisioned in this article is one step removed from these categories 
and relates to flexibility in the process of reaching regulatory decisions—flexibility in 
reaching a desired command, target, consequence, or even source of regulation. Within that 
framework, a chosen regulation may be flexible in the traditional sense, e.g. by using a 
general duty of care or a principle-based model, but is not necessarily so. 
312 J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & 
TECH. 21, 30 (2005). This would, of course, require legislation exempting agencies from the 
APA and analogous state statutes or amendment of the APA. See supra notes 306-11 and 
accompanying text.  
313 Ruhl, supra note 312, at 30. In the context of environmental regulation, at least one scholar 
has laid out a more detailed eight-part protocol: “(1) definition of the problem, (2) determination 
of goals and objectives for management, (3) determination of the baseline, (4) development of 
conceptual models, (5) selection of future actions, (6) implementation and management actions, 
(7) monitoring, and (8) evaluation and return to step (1).” Robin Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing 
Administrative Law for Adaptive Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 7 (2014). 
314 This framework, and the following discussion of the framework, are only a starting point 
and present the broadest outline of what an adaptive approach to autonomous vehicle 
regulation might look like. The aim is not to provide a detailed blueprint for regulatory 
action, but rather to highlight the need for a planned adaptive approach, its advantages over 
extant and proposed approaches to regulating autonomous vehicles, and the core features of 
any such framework. For a more comprehensive discussion of proposed mechanisms for 
implementing a planned adaptive regulatory system, see generally Craig & Ruhl, supra note 
313; J.B. Ruhl, General Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal Systems – 
With Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C.L. REV. 1373 (2011); Camacho, 
supra note 309; Cherry & Bauer, supra note 307; Walker et al., supra note 301. 
315 See supra note 67 and accompanying text (describing the process by which NHTSA 
enacts rules). 
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however, would be to establish a relatively permissive legal environment 
constrained only by minimum safety standards. As adaptive regulation is 
premised on system feedback and adjustment, placing significant restrictions 
on the design and operation of autonomous vehicles could prematurely 
foreclose certain paths for technological development and data collection, 
fostering many of the same problems associated with a precautionary 
approach and technology-specific rules.316 Nevertheless, because regulation 
is an important bulwark against unsafe technologies, and serves a signaling 
function to consumers, autonomous vehicle manufacturers would need to 
provide evidence reasonably suggesting that any proposed design or use is at 
least as safe as traditional driving technology.317 
The second dimension, intensive data collection, would require 
autonomous vehicle manufacturers to gather and report data on all vehicle 
testing, sales, and performance at regular intervals.318 In addition, relevant 
federal and state agencies would be responsible for collecting data related to 
consumer experience, as well as the economic and social impacts of autonomous 
vehicles.319 This reporting and collection of data is essential to an adaptive 
regulatory framework, as any decision to retain, reverse, or otherwise alter 
existing regulations must be empirically driven and based on quantifiable costs, 
																																								 																				
316 See supra Part II.B, section (2)(a). 
317 See NIDHI KALRA & SUSAN M. PADDOCK, supra note 267, at 10-11 (proposing a similar 
standard). This would generally track NHTSA’s standard for granting FMVSS exemptions 
but would not place a cap on autonomous vehicle deployment and could be used as a pre-
market requirement. See 49 U.S.C. § 30113 (allowing for an exemption if, inter alia, the 
applicant demonstrate that the safety level of its feature or vehicle “at least equals the safety 
level of the standard”). On its face, the “at least as safe” standard seems like a burdensome 
requirement analogous to a diluted precautionary approach. However, given the high rate of 
traffic accidents and their overwhelming attribution to human error, see supra note 24, this 
standard would be easy to satisfy. In addition, while initial regulations are important, they 
carry far less weight in an adaptive system, except to the extent that they foreclose certain 
future technological and regulatory opportunities. As such, it makes sense, at least initially, 
to start with a permissive standard.  
318 In its most recent policy statement, NHTSA outlined a much more modest and voluntary 
vision of data collection with respect to limited categories of information. See NHTSA 
POLICY 2017, supra note 55, at 16 (“Entities engaged in ADS testing and deployment may 
demonstrate how they address—via industry best practices, their own best practices, or other 
appropriate methods– the safety elements contained in the Voluntary Guidance by publishing 
a Voluntary Safety Self-Assessment.”). The bills currently pending in Congress also 
contemplate some form of institutionalized data collection, though they provide few details 
on its scope, content, and frequency. See H.R. 3388, 115th Cong. § 4 (2017); S. 1885, 115th 
Cong. § 9 (2017).   
319 This is not an exhaustive list of categories and agencies, within the boundaries of the law, 
should be free to mandate reporting and engage in all data collection necessary to assess 
regulatory performance. 
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benefits, and risks. As such, because any adaptive regulatory framework is 
dependent upon an effective feedback loop in the interval between regulation 
and revision, regulators and stakeholders would need to place a premium on 
designing effective surveillance and research mechanisms. Although the types 
of reported and collected data would likely vary depending on the specific 
subject of regulation (e.g. vehicle design or operation)—and may themselves 
evolve over time as technology changes—the aim would always be to facilitate 
back-end assessment of regulatory and technological impact.  
The third dimension, independent assessment and recommendations 
based on compiled data, is perhaps the most important. The assessment and 
adjustment of existing regulations is at the heart of any adaptive system.320 At 
the outset of each cycle of data collection and assessment, regulators, working 
alone or with industry participants and the public, would identify principles or 
objectives against which performance could be assessed.321 These objectives 
would then guide each scheduled assessment, as well any unilateral emergency 
actions by the agency. In the context of autonomous vehicles, however, the mere 
act of assessment would be insufficient—it is equally important that this 
assessment be conducted by an outside body composed of industry 
stakeholders.322 Since adaptive regulation is a resource-intensive approach 
																																								 																				
320 See Craig & Ruhl, supra note 313, at 18 (identifying “monitoring, assessment, and 
feedback” as common attributes of the different branches of adaptive management theory). 
321 See Walker et al., supra note 306, at 920 (“[P]olicymakers and stakeholders, through 
monitoring and corrective actions, . . . try to keep the system headed toward [its] original 
goals.”). A major point of tension between a planned adaptive approach to regulation and 
traditional administrative law theory is the value of public participation. See Craig & Ruhl, 
supra note 313, at 28, 30 (“One of the critical values enshrined in contemporary 
administrative law is public participation. . . . [A]daptive management threatens, or at least 
is perceived to threaten, the promotion of public participation in traditional administrative 
law.”). The initial articulation of goals and values guiding the evaluation of each iteration of 
a regulatory system, however, offers an important opportunity for public participation in the 
regulatory process. See Lawrence Susskind et al., A Critical Assessment of Collaborative 
Adaptive Management in Practice, 49 J. APPLIED ECOLOGY 47, 49-50 (2012) (pointing to 
the setup phase of adaptive regulation as a promising moment for public participation). 
Indeed, formulation of the plan itself is clearly a moment which lends itself to public input. 
As Craig & Ruhl note, the requirement that agencies “engage in periodic evaluations of their 
progress toward preidentified goals, and hence that they periodically comprehensively adjust 
the management measures that they are employing, provides . . . perfect moments for 
recurring, rather than continual, public participation.” Craig & Ruhl, supra note 313, at 43. 
322 The use of “deliberate organizational separation is a common feature” of existing regulatory 
regimes reflecting a planned adaptive approach. McCray et al., supra note 306, at 958. In 
particular, the “learning” function (reassessing the relevant evidence) is often isolated from the 
“changing” function (deciding whether and how to re-craft the rule). See id. (“[T]he National 
Transportation Safety Board assesses crash evidence, but works at some distance from the 
licensing process at the Federal Aviation Administration, and for air pollution standards the 
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which relies on continuous monitoring, experimentation, and assessment, as well 
as potentially steep compliance costs,323 it is critical that regulators engage 
industry stakeholders in the process of reaching regulatory decisions.324 This co-
ownership over the regulatory process would not only introduce greater 
predictability into the system for targeted entities, but allow targeted entities to 
contribute their expertise and present their positions in a transparent manner.325 
The expertise of industry stakeholders is particularly vital in the context of 
autonomous vehicles, where the technology has developed at such a rapid rate 
that significant informational and technical asymmetries exist between 
stakeholders and the agencies tasked with overseeing them.326 
The final dimension, adjustment, would require agencies to consider the 
assessment and recommendation of the outside committee and make 
adjustments as deemed necessary. Although the agency would be required to 
consider any outside recommendations, such recommendations would be 
precatory and any adjustments ultimately guided by the principles or objectives 
identified in the planned framework.327 This separation of the “assessment” and 
“changing” functions is a common attribute of existing adaptive systems328 and, 
by placing decision making power with the agency, increases the likelihood of 
																																								 																				
science assessment is conducted in a unit that operates at some organizational distance from 
EPA’s air pollution policy office.”). 
323 See infra notes 316-17 and accompanying text (discussing costs as a potential drawback). 
324 This process of outside review and recommendation most closely resembles the review 
mechanism for ambient air quality standards carried out by the EPA pursuant to the Clean 
Air Act, under which an independent Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee reviews 
data compiled by the EPA and issues a subsequent recommendation to the EPA 
Administrator for consideration. See McCray et al., supra note 306, at 954 (describing this 
arrangement). 
325 Indeed, under notice and comment regimes, some work suggests that the majority of 
industry lobbying occurs behind closed doors, before a notice of proposed rulemaking is 
ever published. See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t ‘Screw Joe the Plumber’: The 
Sausage Making of Financial Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 59 (2013) (finding that 
financial industry lobbyists succeeded in swaying “agencies to adopt favorable definitions, 
interpretations, and exemptions [of the Volcker Rule] prior to the NPRM.”). The use of an 
industry advisory board, in contrast, could channel industry positions into the open, as the 
views of regulated entities would be based on publicly available data and clearly 
represented in their published recommendations to the agency.  
326 See Matt McFarland, How Can We Make Sure That Driverless Cars Are Safe?, L.A. TIMES 
(Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-1222-thedownload-driver 
less-car-safety-20151222-story.html (describing state and federal regulators as “lacking expertise 
in the rapidly emerging field”). 
327 See Craig & Ruhl, supra note 313, at 52 (“These goals and objectives provide the overall 
measures against which both the agency and the courts can measure progress in the adaptive 
management process.”). 
328 See supra note 322. 
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reaching socially optimal outcomes.329 Moreover, although business must play 
a central role in autonomous vehicle regulation, questions remain about the 
efficacy of self-regulation and its viability in the context of emerging 
technologies.330   
There are, without a doubt, clear institutional and legal obstacles to 
implementing a system of planned adaptive regulation for autonomous 
vehicles at both the state and federal level.331 These obstacles would not only 
require changes to the procedures governing agency rulemaking and 
amendment,332 but also shifts in the way regulators, stakeholders, and courts 
view the regulatory process.333 As one commentator notes, agencies “have 
not often been rewarded for flexibility, openness, and their willingness to 
experiment, monitor, and adapt.”334 As such, for adaptive regulation of 
autonomous vehicles to succeed, “legislatures must empower [administrative 
agencies] to do it, interest groups must let them do it, and the courts must 
resist the temptation to second-guess when [agencies] do in fact do it.”335 It 
would, in short, require “substantial change” in existing structures and 
assumptions underpinning administrative law.336 This paradigm shift is 
																																								 																				
329 Cf. Cary Coglianese, Engaging Business in the Regulation of Nanotechnology 1, 32 (Univ. 
of Pa. Law Sch., Pub. Law Research Paper No. 12-12, 2010) (“Just as James Madison said 
that government would not be needed if men were angels, regulation of some kind would not 
be needed if businesses already acted in socially optimal ways . . . .”). 
330 See, e.g., Bennear & Coglianese, supra note 311, at 25-29 (describing the mixed results 
of existing and past self-regulatory regimes). In addition, self-regulation could create a 
further democratic deficit.  
331 See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (mandating the procedures federal administrative 
agencies must follow when considering, issuing, and revising rules). 
332 This includes procedures related to the notice and comment process, see 5 U.S.C. § 553, 
amendment of existing regulations, see 5 U.S.C. § 553, and judicial review, see 5 U.S.C. § 
704.  
333 See Ruhl, supra note 313, at 53-54 (“Legislatures, interest groups, and courts have become 
acculturated to a ‘front-end’ style of command-and-control regulation that has dominated for 
decades.”). 
334 R. Edward Grumbine, Reflections on “What is Ecosystem Management?”, 11 CONSER-
VATION BIOLOGY 41, 45 (1997). 
335 Ruhl, supra note 312, at 31. 
336 Id. at 31. See also Warren T. Coleman, Legal Barriers to the Restoration of Aquatic 
Systems and the Utilization of Adaptive Management, 23 VT. L. REV. 177, 197 (1998) (“In 
order for agencies to be free to use adaptive management, the legal framework for decision-
making . . . must explicitly recognize the flexibility needed to manage adaptively, yet still 
provide a degree of finality to those parties affected by resource management 
decisions. Solving this puzzle will require broader change rather than piecemeal legislation 
or legal maneuvering within the existing legal framework.”). But see Timothy H. Profeta, 
Managing Without a Balance: Environmental Regulation in Light of Ecological Advances, 
7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 71, 96 (1996) (“As long as an adaptive management [project] 
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certainly attainable, and some existing regulatory frameworks at the federal 
level incorporate aspects of planned adaptive regulation, but it would not 
occur naturally.337 Indeed, scholarship like this article will play an essential 
role in highlighting the need for a shift by laying bare the shortcomings in 
existing regulatory processes and the responses to these shortcomings. 
Importantly, an increased emphasis on regulatory process—that is, 
adaptability—over ex ante regulatory substance improves on common 
responses to the pacing problem in two important ways. First, an adaptive 
approach offers a middle ground between inaction and prohibition. Although 
regulators may determine that autonomous vehicles are best governed with a 
light touch, the potential safety risks associated with the technology and 
fallout from highly visible accidents make it critical that some form of 
government regulation guarantee minimum levels of safety and, just as 
importantly, sow consumer confidence in the technology.338 At the same time, 
embracing the opposite extreme and slowing the development of autonomous 
vehicles in response to potential risks would be equally crude and forgo 
significant benefits due to comparably small or unproven costs.339 The use of 
a planned adaptive approach has the potential to occupy a productive 
compromise between both extremes.  
Second, given the desirability of some form of regulatory response, 
an adaptive approach also offers clear advantages over future-facing and 
technology-neutral laws. In particular, adaptive regulation avoids the pitfalls 
of static mandates by responding to, rather than locking in or implicitly 
anticipating, specific evolutions in autonomous vehicle technology. Instead 
of making an educated guess as to the most likely or desirable developmental 
path of autonomous vehicle technology, an adaptive approach allows for 
adjustment based on real-world data, active debate, and changes in the market 
or society. Moreover, although broadly worded technology-neutral rules may 
be warranted based on the observed effects of prior regulations or some 
aspect of future autonomous vehicle technology, regulators in a planned 
adaptive system can offer greater clarity and specificity in their rules given 
their iterative nature. In other words, there is no need to “future proof” laws 
because, if warranted, they can always be revisited.   
																																								 																				
is approved pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, then each individual manipulation 
in the management plan should not violate due process.”). 
337 See McCray et al., supra note 306, at 954-56 (describing existing programs of planned 
adaptation, including regulation of ambient air standards, commercial air transportation 
safety, and post-market drug safety). For a full discussion of the legal obstacles facing an 
adaptive approach to regulation, see generally Craig & Ruhl, supra note 313, at 26-38. 
338 See supra Part II.B, section (1)(b). 
339 See supra Part II.B, section (2)(a). 
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This is not to suggest that, as applied to autonomous vehicles, adaptive 
regulation is without its flaws.340 An adaptive approach has the potential to 
impose significant new costs on both administrative agencies and industry 
stakeholders.341 These costs would stem from both the mandated collection and 
assessment of data, as well as greater compliance costs related to the potential 
unpredictability of future revision.342 In addition, scheduled revision and the 
initial identification of goals could create a series of lobbying opportunities by 
industry stakeholders, potentially adding to the already significant risk of 
regulatory capture.343 There is also a chance, as mentioned above, that agency 
officials would be reluctant to implement such a system due to institutional 
inertia, a preference for the status quo, or concerns about agency credibility.344  
Although these concerns deserve attention, most can be mitigated or 
resolved. Industry involvement in the collection and analysis of impact data, 
for example, should make any changes based thereupon reasonably 
foreseeable and allow ample time for planning during the collection process. 
In addition, given the potential prevalence of backroom lobbying under 
notice and comment regimes, the use of an industry advisory board could 
actually channel otherwise opaque industry positions into the open, as 
industry views would be based on publicly available data and expounded in 
published recommendations. Still, more work is needed to understand the 
potential impacts and industry reception of planned adaptive regulation as 
applied to autonomous vehicles. What appears clear, however, is that a  
planned adaptive approach offers regulators the best opportunity to balance 
safety, public confidence, and the realization of autonomous vehicles’ many 
potential benefits in an increasingly fluid technological environment. 
																																								 																				
340 Nor is adaptive regulation desirable in every aspect of autonomous vehicle regulation. 
The definition of what it means to be a driver, as discussed in Part II, or how humans are 
licensed in autonomous vehicles, won’t need to be constantly adapted—they do not 
necessarily depend on the details of the technology. 
341 See Eric Biber, Adaptive Management and the Future of Environmental Law, 46 AKRON 
L. REV. 933, 945-951 (detailing the potential costs of planned adaptive regulation); see also 
HOLLY DOREMUS ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, MAKING GOOD USE OF ADAPTIVE 
MANAGEMENT 1, 5 (2011) (suggesting that planned adaptive regulation “requires more 
resources than conventional [regulation], because doing it right requires taking the time to 
carefully analyze the system at the outset, monitor the results, and periodically reassess and 
revise”). These analyses, however, do not appear to consider any countervailing cost savings 
which might result from an adaptive approach. 
342 See Biber, supra note 341, at 945-51. 
343 See Charles K. Whitehead, The Goldilocks Approach: Financial Risk and Staged 
Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1267, 1305 (2012) (making this point in the context of 
staging and sunsetting provisions). 
344 See McCray et al., supra note 306, at 957 (discussing why administrative agencies may 
be reluctant to embrace adaptive management).   
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CONCLUSION 
	
The rise of autonomous vehicles promises significant social, economic, 
and environmental benefits. At the same time, their rapid emergence and 
evolution pose a unique challenge to the federal and state regulators tasked with 
ensuring their safe and successful adoption. In particular, as with a growing 
number of new technologies, autonomous vehicles strain the reactive and 
adaptive capabilities of U.S. legal institutions. At the heart of this tension are 
several characteristics of traditional sources of regulation—legislatures, 
agencies, and courts—which make it difficult, if not impossible, for the law to 
keep pace with new technologies. Although regulators have attempted to address 
this pacing problem in a number of ways, including through inaction, precaution, 
and proactivity, these responses suffer from shortcomings equal to or greater 
than those caused by the underlying defect. This problem has placed lawmakers 
in a difficult position and increases the risk that autonomous vehicles will fail to 
achieve widespread adoption.  
To address this quandary and maximize the benefits of autonomous 
vehicles, I have argued that lawmakers should draw on the principles of planned 
adaptive regulation. A planned adaptive approach to regulating autonomous 
vehicle operation and design would require the institutionalization of 
monitoring-adjustment frameworks which allow for incremental policy 
adjustments. Although this would be a sharp departure from traditional static 
models of regulation and could impose new costs on agencies and regulated 
entities, it offers significant advantages over static systems. Most importantly, 
rather than attempting to treat the pacing problem’s symptoms through ex ante 
“best guess” regulation, a planned adaptive approach directly targets its root 
causes through institutional reforms. More work is needed to understand the 
potential impacts and reception of planned adaptive regulation, as well as to 
detail the mechanics of implementing such a system. Nevertheless, this article 
offers the first comprehensive analysis of the full scope and implications of the 
pacing problem and, based on that analysis, the outline for a corresponding 
regulatory solution in the context of autonomous vehicles. 
 
